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**Does Bail Reform Increase Crime?
An Empirical Assessment of the Public
Safety Implications of Bail Reform in
Cook County, Illinois**

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ABSTRACT

Recently bail reform issues have been in the news across the country, as concerns about fair treatment of defendants and possible public safety risks from expanding pretrial release have collided. These issues involve important empirical questions, including whether releasing more defendants before trial leads to additional crimes. An opportunity to investigate this public safety issue has developed in Chicago, our nation's third largest city. There, the Office of the Chief Judge of the Cook County Courts adopted new bail reform measures in September 2017 and reviewed them empirically in May 2019. Cook County's Bail Reform Study concluded that the new procedures had released many more defendants before trial without any concomitant increase in crime. This article disputes the Study's conclusions. This article explains that, contrary to the Study's assertions, the new changes to pretrial release procedures appear to have led to a substantial increase in crimes committed by pretrial releasees in Cook County. Properly measured and estimated, after more generous release procedures were put in place, the number of released defendants charged with committing new crimes increased by 45%. And, more concerning, the number of pretrial releasees charged with committing new violent crimes increased by an estimated 33%. In addition, as reported by the Chicago Tribune, the Study's data appears to undercount the number of releasees charged with new violent crimes; and a substantial number of aggravated domestic violence prosecutions prosecutors dropped after the changes, presumably because batterers were able to more frequently obtain release and intimidate their victims into not pursuing charges. These public safety concerns call into question whether the bail "reform" measures implemented in Cook County were cost-beneficial. And because Cook County's procedures are state-of-the-art and track those being implemented in many parts of the country, Cook County's experience suggests that other jurisdictions may similarly be suffering increases in crime due to bail reform.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Bail reform issues have recently been in the news across the country. Reformers and their critics have argued about the ways to make the nation's pretrial release procedures fairer while at the same time protecting the public from crimes from released defendants.¹ Reformers have claimed that traditional cash bail requirements for pretrial release needlessly incarcerate many indigent individuals merely because they are unable to raise the required sums. And, the critique continues, those incarcerated are mostly poor and disproportionately black or Hispanic—individuals who are presumed to be innocent and could often be released before trial without jeopardizing public safety.² In light of that widely accepted criticism, many jurisdictions have experimented with new procedures that reduce the use of cash bail as a requirement for a defendant's release and, more broadly, that lead to the release of more defendants before trial.

Bail reform critics have responded that the expanded release of defendants leads to an increase in crime.³ For example, in New York, more generous pretrial release procedures have been blamed for an upsurge in crime at the beginning of this

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¹ See generally SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, *THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT BAIL IN AMERICA'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM* (2017).

² See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, *BAIL REFORM: A GUIDE FOR STATE AND LOCAL POLICY MAKERS* (2019), available at http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/BailReform_WEB.pdf.

³ See, e.g., Jesse McKinley et al., *Why Abolishing Bail for Some Crimes Has Law Enforcement on Edge*, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2019; Dan Frosch & Ben Chapman, *New Bail Laws Leading to Release of Dangerous Criminals, Some Prosecutors Say*, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2020.

year.⁴ As such reform measures continue to be considered in counties and states around the nation, arguments about their effects on public safety will likely be at the forefront public policy debates.⁵

An opportunity to empirically assess these public safety issues has recently developed in Cook County, Illinois—one of the nation’s largest trial court systems (which includes all of Chicago, the nation’s third largest city). On September 18, 2017, the Chief Judge of the Cook County Circuit Court (Judge Timothy Evans) implemented sweeping bail reforms by issuing General Order 18.8A (G.O. 18.8A). The Order was designed to not only reduce reliance on money bail but also increase pretrial releases in Cook County courts. About a year-and-a-half later, Chief Judge Evans reviewed the results of these new procedures and published a study entitled “Bail Reform in Cook County” (which we will refer to as the “Bail Reform Study”).⁶ The Study trumpets the fact that the new pretrial reforms led to a significant increase in the percentage of defendants who were released before trial—from about 72% of all defendants to about 81% of all defendants.⁷ And the Study also argues that this increase in pretrial releases was accompanied by “considerable stability” in the “community safety rate” of the releases.⁸ Specifically, the Study claims that the new, more generous release procedures did not increase crime, stating that “[i]t should be noted that the increase in pretrial release has not led to an increase in crime”⁹ and that the changes have “not led to an increase in violent crime in Chicago.”¹⁰

Such research designed to develop empirical evidence on the effect of new judicial practices is commendable. Judges may be reluctant to make changes, falling prey to the same “preferences for the familiar status quo as the rest of us.”¹¹ Thus, judges may need prodding to make changes in long-standing procedures, such as money bail. And yet, it is important that any “reform” measure be a genuine

⁴ See Ben Chapman & Katie Honan, *New York City Police Commissioner Blames New Bail Law for Rising Crime*, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2020

⁵ See Center on Media, Crime, and Justice, *Prosecutors, Legislators Push Back Against Bail Reform*, THE CRIME REPORT (Feb. 11, 2020) (noting bail reform initiatives adopted in more than 20 states and many counties).

⁶ OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUDGE, CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, BAIL REFORM IN COOK COUNTY: AN EXAMINATION OF GENERAL ORDER 18.8A AND BAIL IN FELONY CASES (2019) (hereinafter BAIL REFORM STUDY).

⁷ *Id.* at 24 (“a larger percentage of post-G.O. 18.8A defendants had secured release than their pre-G.O. 18.8A counterparts (pre = 71.6% vs. post = 80.5%)”).

⁸ *Id.* at 33.

⁹ *Id.* at 1.

¹⁰ *Id.* at 2.

¹¹ Matthew Tokson, *Judicial Resistance and Legal Change*, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 903 (2015).

improvement. Only if empirical research accurately captures what has happened after a change in judicial procedures can the reform measure's value be evaluated.¹²

In this article, we explore the public safety implications of the Cook County changes and specifically the Bail Reform Study's sanguine conclusions that the new procedures did not lead to more crimes. While the two of us have differing points of view on various subjects, we both are committed to empirically assessing such questions—a pragmatic bent that has led us to team up in the past,¹³ including researching Chicago crime issues.¹⁴ Having carefully reviewed the Bail Reform Study, we have serious doubts about its upbeat conclusions.

Properly understood, the Study's data raises significant concerns about what happened after changes in Cook County's pretrial release procedures. The Study fails to recognize that, given that more defendants are being released after the reforms, even a "stable" rate of community safety will inexorably lead to more crimes. That stable rate of safety—and, inversely, the stable rate of failure or public safety danger—applies across a larger pool of released defendants, which necessarily means that the public suffers additional crimes. In other words, at least in Cook County, more bail reform apparently means more crimes.

In addition, we find that, contrary to the Study's suggestion of stability, the number of crimes committed by pretrial releasees appears to have significantly increased. Correctly estimated, the number of released defendants charged with committing new crimes increased by about 45% after G.O. 18.8A's implementation. And, more concerning, the number of pretrial releasees charged with new violent crimes increased by about 33%. In addition, as reported by the *Chicago Tribune*, good reasons exist for concluding that these figures on violent crimes committed by releasees undercounted what really happened after the reforms, including failing to capture a significant number of additional murders. And finally, as also reported by the *Chicago Tribune*, the percentage of aggravated domestic violence prosecutions that prosecutors dropped increased from 56% before G.O. 18.8A to 70% after. A reasonable inference is that the increase in dropped cases resulted from batterers

¹² See, e.g., Richard Fowles & Sofia Nyström, *Introduction to an Econometric Cost-Benefit Approach: Utah Cost of Crime*, Utah Comm'n on Crim. and Juv. Justice (2012), available at <http://www.justice.utah.gov/Documents/CCJJ/Cost%20of%20Crime/Utah%20Cost%20of%20Crime%202012%20-%20Methods%20Review%20Cost.pdf>.

¹³ See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, *Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement*, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998); Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, *Still Handcuffing the Cops? A Review of Fifty Years of Empirical Evidence of Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement*, 2017 BOST. U.L. REV. 685 (2017).

¹⁴ See Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, *What Caused the 2016 Chicago Homicide Spike? An Empirical Examination of the "ACLU Effect" and the Role of Stop and Frisks in Preventing Gun Violence*, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1582.

more frequently obtaining pretrial release and intimidating their victims into not pursuing charges at trial.

These public safety harms call into question whether the bail reform measures as implemented in Cook County were cost-beneficial. And because Cook County's procedures are state-of-the-art and track those being implemented in many parts of the country, Cook County's experience suggests that other jurisdictions may similarly be suffering increases in crime due to bail reform. Accordingly, our findings will be useful to policymakers across the country as they consider whether and how to implement changes in pretrial release procedures.

Our analysis proceeds in several steps. Part II initially describes how pretrial release procedures have worked in Cook County before the recent reforms and then after.

Part III reviews the Bail Reform Study's argument that the expansion in pretrial releases has not increased the crimes committed in Cook County. Because many factors apart from pretrial release procedures can affect aggregate crime totals, looking generally to such aggregations is an inappropriate way for determining G.O. 18.8A's public safety implications.

Part IV turns specifically to crimes committed by pretrial releasees and examines data presented in the Bail Reform Study about a "stable" community safety rate before and after the changes. Examining the issue more closely, we find that the Study's data suggest substantial increases in the total number of crimes committed by pretrial releasees after the implementation of more generous release procedures, including increases in violent crimes. We also concur with conclusions of the *Chicago Tribune* that the Study's methodology and data significantly undercount the number of defendants who committed violent crimes after the changes. Finally, for domestic violence cases, it appears (as first reported by the *Chicago Tribune*) that many abusers were able to take advantage of new release procedures to intimidate their victims into having charges dropped.

Part V then considers how these crime increases might factor into a more extended cost-benefit analysis assessing Cook County's reforms. While we are unable to provide a full cost-benefit analysis, clear reasons exist for thinking that the recent changes may not have been net beneficial.

Part VI concludes with some implications of our paper for changes in pretrial release procedures elsewhere. Because the kinds of changes that were made in Cook County in 2017 are being pursued in other jurisdictions, we caution that public safety dangers similar to what we found in Cook County may be occurring in these other jurisdictions as well.

II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CHANGES MADE BY THE COOK COUNTY BAIL REFORMS

In this section, we briefly review, first, the changes made to bail procedures by G.O. 18.8A,¹⁵ and then, second, the conclusions reached by the Bail Reform Study.

By way of historical background, bail reform has long been an issue in Cook County, with concern about cash bail systems dating back to the early part of the Twentieth Century.¹⁶ More recently, the critique has been that judges in Cook County, distrusting information provided by pretrial services, set large cash bonds as a means of detaining defendants, even defendants who are being held on relatively minor charges.¹⁷ In October 2016, a class-action lawsuit was filed in Illinois state court, challenging Cook County's bail system.¹⁸ While that case was ultimately dismissed without a decision on the merits,¹⁹ advocacy efforts connected with the lawsuit lead to new legislation in Illinois, the Bail Reform Act of 2017.²⁰ The Act encouraged (but not require) expanded use of non-monetary alternatives to cash bail.

In line with the suggestion of the new legislation, on September 18, 2017, Chief Judge Evans of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, issued G.O. 18.8A, which was designed to both reduce the use of cash bail and increase the number of defendants released before trial.²¹ These are two separate issues. While the shorthand phrase "bail reform" is often used to cover both topics, it is possible to eliminate cash "bail" while at the same time increasing the number of persons

¹⁵ See generally BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 2, at 4–5. A copy of the order can be found at

<http://www.cookcountycourt.org/Portals/0/Orders/General%20Order%20No.%2018.8a.pdf>.

¹⁶ See, e.g., ARTHUR L. BEELEY, *THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO* (1927). Cf. Amos N. Guiora, *Transnational Comparative Analysis of Balancing Competing Interests in Counter-Terrorism*, 20 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 363, 365 (2006) (discussing denial of bail to suspected radicals in the early Twentieth Century).

¹⁷ See Alexa van Brunt & Locke E. Bowman, *Toward a Just Model of Pretrial Release: A History of Bail Reform and a Prescription for What's New*, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 701, 761-62 (2019).

¹⁸ *Robinson v. Martin*, No. 2016 CH 13587 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2016).

¹⁹ Order Granting Section 2-619.1 Motion to Dismiss, *Robinson*, No. 2016 CH 13587 (filed June 26, 2017); see also van Brunt & Bowman, *supra* note 17, at 762; see also Megan Crepeau, Judge Throws out Proposed Class-Action Lawsuit over Cook County Bond Practices, CHI. TRIB., June 28, 2019, available at <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-met-cash-bail-lawsuit-dismissed-20180627-story.html>.

²⁰ The Bail Reform Act of 2017, S.B. 2034, 100th Gen. Assembly (Ill. 2017).

²¹ BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 2, at 1-6; see also Megan Crepeau, *Judges Ordered to Set Affordable Bonds for Defendants who Pose no Danger*, CHI. TRIB., July 17, 2017, available at <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-cook-county-bail-reform-met-20170717-story.html> (visited Jan. 23, 2020).

detained before trial. Bail has simply been the historical device often used as part of detention decisions.

In this paper, our interest is not in whether Cook County courts reduced or eliminated cash bail as a means for essentially detaining defendants (and assuring their appearance at trial). Indeed, we have some sympathy for the argument that monetary bail is an ineffective mechanism for making such determinations. Instead, our focus here is on the distinct question of how many persons should be released pretrial considering the public safety risks associated with placing a suspected criminal back on the streets.

G.O. 18.8A was designed to expand the pretrial release of defendants awaiting trial. Chief Judge Evans established a new division within the Circuit Court (the “Pretrial Division”), which focuses on bail hearings and related determinations in connection with G.O. 18.8A. Under the new procedures, when a defendant is arrested, he²² is first given an initial bail hearing in what is often referred to as a “bond hearing.” During this hearing, the defendant can argue for release before one of the pretrial judges who are responsible for determining this issue, including the type and amount of bond or other conditions of release.²³

In determining release issues, the court must ensure that the kind of bond imposed will assure the appearance of a defendant in court, the safety of the community, and compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of release. In addition to these factors, the court must also consider the facts of the case, the other requirements of the new Illinois statute, input from the defense and prosecution, and a public safety assessment (“PSA”). The PSA was created and implemented by Chief Judge Evans in 2013 with the assistance of the Laura and John Arnold Foundation and is designed to measure where releasing a defendant before trial is dangerous to the community.²⁴

Following an evaluation of all these factors, the pretrial judge can detain a defendant or allow release based on several different types of bonds, including release on individual recognizance (an “I-Bond”), a deposit bond, or a cash bond.²⁵ Additionally, nonmonetary conditions may be imposed with any bail, including (but not limited to) electronic monitoring and pretrial supervision within the community.²⁶

²² For convenience, we use male pronouns in referring to defendants involved in the study, as more than 80% of the defendants were male. BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 2, at 33 (table 7B).

²³ *Id.*

²⁴ *Id.* at 3.

²⁵ *Id.* at 4.

²⁶ *Id.* at 3.

Although the presumption under G.O. 18.8A is non-monetary pretrial release, if monetary bail is determined necessary to ensure the defendant's appearance in court, the amount of bond required is to be determined based upon the defendant's ability to pay and should not serve as an oppressive barrier to pretrial release. Ultimately, in situations where monetary bail is warranted, it should not be a pretrial punishment against the defendant and should be affordable.²⁷

Approximately eighteen months following the implementation of G.O. 18.8A, in May 2019, the Chief Judge Evans released a 39-page report entitled "Bail Reform in Cook County."²⁸ The Bail Reform Study contained detailed information about the effects from the changes in pretrial release procedures, including several conclusions related to the effectiveness of the Order regarding recidivism, jail populations, and types of bail imposed.

One important conclusion from the Study was that pretrial release of defendants had expanded significantly under the new procedures. While before G.O. 18.8A 71.6% of felony defendants had secured pretrial release, after the Order 80.5% of such defendants were released.²⁹ This meant that in the 15 months before the Order, 20,435 defendants were released while awaiting trial; in the 15 months after the Order, 24,504 defendants were released—about four thousand more defendants. The Study explained that mechanism for these additional releases was a significant increase in individual recognizance releases with a corresponding decrease in the rate of cash bond releases.³⁰ Further, the Study noted that when cash bail was required, the amounts were significantly more affordable.³¹ The Study also found that persons who were released pretrial generally appeared for subsequent court hearings.³²

Among the various findings announced in the Study, perhaps the most encouraging was its assertion that the reforms had substantially reduced jail populations without increasing crime (and particularly violent crime) in Cook County. The Study claimed that "the increase in pretrial release has not led to an increase in crime"³³ and that "bail reform has not led to an increase in violent crime in Chicago."³⁴

²⁷ *Id.* at 4.

²⁸ *Id.*

²⁹ *Id.* at 24.

³⁰ *Id.* at 1.

³¹ *Id.* at 2.

³² *Id.* at 30-32. Because our focus is on public safety implications of G.O. 18.8A, we do not explore this issue of appearance at trial in this article.

³³ *Id.* at 1.

³⁴ *Id.* at 2.

Although the Study generally provided a positive assessment of the reform, the Study included several caveats. Perhaps the most significant stipulation was that there remained the need to continually monitor and update the public safety assessment instrument to ensure that properly measured defendants' dangerousness if released.³⁵ For example, the Study conceded that, following the implementation of G.O. 18.8A, it appeared that some defendants granted pretrial release were subsequently arrested on murder charges.³⁶ The Study explained that using a PSA as a part of release decisions means using "a probabilistic tool" that "will fail at times to accurately predict human behavior. When this happens, community members can be victimized and the Court acknowledges this very unfortunate possibility."³⁷ Nonetheless, the Study concluded, the risk of crimes committed by pretrial releasees "exists in any criminal justice system that relies on pretrial release."³⁸ The Study concluded that the changes had been, on balance, cost-beneficial: G.O. 18.8A had been "associated with positive changes in the process" because it "allowed more pretrial defendants to remain in their communities pending resolution of their cases where they can work, pursue education, and support their families without an increased threat to public safety."³⁹

III. THE BAIL REFORM STUDY'S CONCLUSIONS ABOUT LINKAGES TO THE TOTAL NUMBER OF CRIMES IN COOK COUNTY.

The Bail Reform Study was generally greeted with enthusiasm in Chicago—particularly the finding that expanded releases did not increase crime. For example, shortly after the Study's publication, the Chicago Council of Lawyers distributed a statement that bail reform "has been a tremendous success."⁴⁰ Noting the public safety assertions in the Study, the Council of Lawyers argued that releasing "more pretrial defendants simply [has not] had the harmful effects opponents predicted" and that "[o]pponents of bail reform who still state that bond reform is dangerous should be consistently asked to defend their opposition to bond reform in light of what this data shows us."⁴¹

We do not count ourselves among the opponents (or proponents) of bail reform. Instead, our interest is the same as the Chicago Council of Lawyer's: What the data show us. Unfortunately, we believe that the reported statistics do not prove what the Study suggests. In broadly asserting that the data prove that pretrial release reform

³⁵ *Id.* at 36.

³⁶ *Id.*

³⁷ *Id.*

³⁸ *Id.*

³⁹ *Id.*

⁴⁰ A Policy Statement from Chicago Appleseed and the Chicago Council of Lawyers (June 11, 2019), available at <https://chicagocouncil.org/the-data-is-out-bond-reform-in-cook-county-has-been-a-tremendous-success/> (visited Jan. 23, 2020).

⁴¹ *Id.*

did not increase crime in the Chicago area, the Study advances an unsustainable position.

One fundamental problem is that looking merely at a change in the total number of crimes after a reform and then attributing the change (or stability) to that single factor is not how well-regarded criminology studies are conducted. Instead, a researcher must consider potential confounding variables that might contribute to any trends.

For example, we recently published a study considering the effects on Chicago's crime rates from changes in stop-and-frisk policy that occurred in late 2015.⁴² Rather than examine before-and-after crime totals, we ran multiple regression equations controlling for a variety of factors that have been reported in the literature to have some association with crimes, including not only the stop-and-frisk variable of interest to us but also temperature, the number of 9-1-1 calls to police, the Chicago area unemployment rate, homicides in the surrounding areas, property crime arrests, violent crime arrests, gun arrests, shooting arrests, drug arrests, and trends over time.⁴³ We then made a qualitative examination of other possible confounding variables before attempting to reach tentative causal conclusions.⁴⁴ The Bail Reform Study failed to take any of those steps—or even anything resembling them.⁴⁵

The Bail Reform Study's failure to control for other factors such as these is a serious problem because parts of the “before” and “after” periods for the study coincided with an intense effort in Chicago to reduce the crime rates in the wake of the 2016 Chicago homicide spike. Some tragic history is important to recount here. In 2016, Chicago garnered unwanted attention for a nearly unprecedented spike in homicides—a “crushing wave of violence.”⁴⁶ More than 750 people were killed in Chicago in 2016, the highest number of homicides the city experienced in nearly 20 years.⁴⁷ In fact, in the previous nine years, Chicago's yearly homicides were between

⁴² See Cassell & Fowles, *supra* note 14.

⁴³ See *id.* at 1613-18.

⁴⁴ See *id.* at 1618-43.

⁴⁵ The study also asserts that public safety was protected under G.O. 18.8A because there was an increase in “no bail orders” under the new procedures. BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 6, at 2. But this appears to have been a mere procedural change regarding the way in which defendants were detained. Previously it appears that many presumptively dangerous defendants were, as a practical matter, detained through the setting of high bail figures. See *id.* at 22 (Table 3B) (noting substantially higher bond amounts imposed before G.O. 18.8A).

⁴⁶ *The Chicago Lessons That Chicago Has to Relearn*, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 25, 2016, at 22 2016 WLNR 29152627.

⁴⁷ Azadeh Ansari & Rosa Flores, *Chicago's 762 Homicides in 2016 is Highest in 19 Years*, CNN (Jan. 2, 2017 22:20 GMT), <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/01/us/chicago-murders-2016/index.html>.

400 and 500.⁴⁸ In January 2017, the television program *60 Minutes* aired “Crisis in Chicago,” in which the program’s correspondent recounted, “In the six days we were in Chicago, 55 people were shot, 16 were killed. We were struck by just how routine it all felt. The dead and wounded were removed with grim efficiency—right down to the hazmat crews that cleaned away the blood. Murder seemed almost normal.”⁴⁹ On the last day of that bloody year, hundreds of Chicagoans marched down Michigan Avenue (Chicago’s “Magnificent Mile”), carrying more than 750 crosses, each numbered to represent where each death fell in the year’s homicide count.⁵⁰

This history has a potential impact on the Bail Reform Study. The “before” period in the study is the fifteen months of July 1, 2016, through September 30, 2017. Thus, a significant part of the “before” period (July through December 2016) coincides with a dramatic increase in homicides and shootings in Chicago—the Chicago homicide spike.⁵¹

As a result of that spike, federal, state, and local authorities all brought to bear important crime-fighting measures, mostly starting in around the first half of 2017 and continuing through 2018.⁵² For example, Mayor Rahm Emanuel hired hundreds of new police officers in 2017 and 2018. In June 2017, the Illinois Legislature passed a law increasing sentences for repeat gun offenders. In 2017, the federal government deployed many new ATF (Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) agents and federal prosecutors in Chicago increasingly focused on gun crimes. In 2017, new “shot-stopper” technology was also deployed in Chicago’s high crime neighborhoods. And a Partnership for Safe and Peaceful Communities was formed that committed \$75 million toward reducing gun violence in Chicago.⁵³

Fortunately, it appears that all of these efforts, in combination, had at least some success in reducing Chicago’s homicide and shooting crimes, reductions that

⁴⁸ Ray Sanchez & Jason Hanna, *Chicago Police Tout 14% Homicide Drop, and Concede There’s More To Do*, CNN, Dec. 1, 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/12/01/us/chicago-homicide-shooting-statistics/index.html>.

⁴⁹ *Chicago’s Crime Epidemic: How You Can Help*, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 4, 2017, at 16, 2017 WLNR 234998.

⁵⁰ Marwa Eltagouri, *Crosses Witness to Those Killed in 2016*, CHI TRIB., Jan. 1, 2017, at 13, 2017 WLNR 35661.


⁵¹ See Cassell & Fowles, *supra* note 14, at 1595-96.

⁵² See *id.* at 1639-42.

⁵³ Inquirer Editorial Board, *Important lessons for Philadelphia from Chicago’s Three-Year Decline in Gun Violence*, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 10, 2020, available at <https://www.inquirer.com/opinion/editorials/chicago-homicides-decline-gun-violence-shootings-philadelphia-20200110.html>; see also PSPC – Partnership for Safe and Peaceful Communities, <https://safeandpeaceful.org/about-us/>.

coincided with the adoption of changes to pretrial release policies.⁵⁴ Without any effort to control for these other factors that likely reduced crime in Chicago more extensively during the “after” period than the “before” period, it would be unreasonable to assert that pretrial release changes did not affect crime in Chicago.

Also, it is well known that violent crime in Chicago (and many other large cities in cold weather climates) exhibits “seasonality”—that is, more violent crimes occur in the warmer months than in the colder months. Our previous paper on the Chicago homicide spike, for example, contained this graph showing the monthly data for shooting deaths in Chicago over five years, including 2016 (the year of the spike).⁵⁵ As is readily apparent, during the “summer” months (i.e., June, July, and August) the number of shootings can be as much as three times higher (or even more) compared to the number committed during winter months.



Source: Chicago Police Department Data

⁵⁴ See generally Cassell & Fowles, *supra* note 14, at 1639-42 (discussing homicide decline in Chicago in 2017 and noting multiple factors, such as those discussed in the previous paragraph, that were likely responsible).

⁵⁵ *Id.* at 1591 (Figure 3).

As we explained in our earlier paper, the standard explanation for these cyclical variations is that crime data exhibit “seasonality,” with more crimes committed in the warmer months than in the colder months. Good empirical support exists for this explanation,⁵⁶ particularly given that some studies find that crime seasonality is stronger in cities with colder climates,⁵⁷ a group which includes Chicago. The connection between crime and weather, however, is not always perfect.⁵⁸ For instance, an analysis of Chicago crime data by the *Chicago Tribune* concluded that while frequency for several crimes increased with temperature, homicides did not.⁵⁹

The fact that the Bail Reform Study includes more warm weather months in the fifteen-month “before” period than in the fifteen-month “after” period would artificially depress the number of crimes committed in the after period, potentially obscuring any increase in crime due to the pretrial release changes. In particular, the “before” period was July 1, 2016 through September 30, 2017; the “after” period was October 1, 2017, through December 31, 2018.⁶⁰ Thus the “before” period includes five of the most high-crime months; the “after” period includes only three of the most-high crimes months. An apples-to-apples comparison would be to use

⁵⁶ See, e.g., Craig A. Anderson, *Heat and Violence*, CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 33 (2001) (concluding hot temperatures increase violence directly by increasing feelings of hostility); Gerhard J. Falk, *The Influence of the Seasons on the Crime Rate*, 43 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 199, 212 (1952) (violent crimes consistently reach the maximum frequency in the summer, but criminal homicides can be higher in December than in June and August); Brian Jacobs et al., *The Dynamics of Criminal Behavior: Evidence from Weather Shocks*, 42 J. HUM. RESOURCES 489 (2007) (finding that weather, and particularly temperature, is strongly correlated with violent crime); Shannon J. Linning et al., *Crime Seasonality: Examining the Temporal Fluctuations of Property Crime in Cities with Varying Climates*, 61 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 1866 (2017); see also Andrew W. Lehren & Al Baker, *In New York, Number of Killings Rises with Heat*, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2009 (qualitatively concluding that more homicides occur in New York during the summer), <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/19/nyregion/19murder.html>.

⁵⁷ See, e.g., J.R. Hipp et al., *Crimes of Opportunity or Crimes of Emotion? Testing Two Explanations of Seasonal Change in Crime*, 82 SOC. FORCES 13333 (2004); Linning et al., *supra* note 56, at 1884–88; D. McDowall et al., *Seasonal Cycles in Crime, and their Variability*, 28 J. QUAN. CRIMINOLOGY 389 (2012).

⁵⁸ See, e.g., Ellen G. Cohn, *Weather and Crime*, 30 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY. 51 (1990) (finding that while assaults tend to increase with temperature, at least up to 85°, the relationship for homicides is uncertain).

⁵⁹ Mowafak Allaham & Ryan Marx, *Does a Hot Summer Mean More Crime? Here’s What the Data Show*, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 23, 2017, <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/data/ct-crime-heat-analysis-htmlstory.html>; see also Dean DeChiaro, *Does Chicago’s Homicide Rate Rise and Fall with Cold Winter Weather?*, MEDILL REP. CHI., Feb. 5, 2015, <http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/does-chicagos-homicide-rate-rise-and-fall-with-cold-winter-weather-2/>.

⁶⁰ BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 6, at 1.

twelve-months both before and after. Unfortunately, the Study's presentation of its data does not readily permit us to undertake such a reanalysis.

Finally, an even more important point about the Study's conclusion that crime rates did not increase after bail reform is that pretrial releasees are only a part of the crime problem. Persons not on pretrial release commit many significant crimes. Without a better understanding of what fraction of crimes are committed by pretrial releasees, it would be difficult to draw firm conclusions about linkages between total crimes in Cook County and changes to pretrial release procedures.

IV. THE BAIL REFORM STUDY'S CONCLUSIONS ABOUT CRIMES COMMITTED BY PRETRIAL RELEASEES

Because of the problems just discussed, it is difficult to look simply at the total number of crimes in Cook County and then draw firm conclusions about the effects of bail reform on public safety. One would need more refined analysis to make reliable conclusions.

But an alternative way of measuring the impact of bail reform on public safety avoids most of these difficulties—a method which the Bail Reform Study implicitly adopts. Instead of tabulating all the crimes committed in Cook County, it is possible instead to drill down just into the subset of crimes committed by pretrial releasees.⁶¹ The Study attempts to do this, collecting data and then asserting that there was no “increased threat to public safety” as a result of changes made by G.O. 18.8A.⁶²

In this Part, we examine whether the Study's assertion is true. On closer examination, we find that both the number of crimes and the number of violent crimes committed by pretrial releasees appears to have substantially increased after G.O. 18.8A, contrary to the Study's assertions. In addition, it appears that the Study

⁶¹ We follow the same approach as the authors of the Bail Reform Study in using a new arrest as an indicator that a new crime was committed. We recognize, of course, that someone who is re-arrested is legally presumed to be innocent. But for purposes of determining danger to public safety, a re-arrest is a commonly used measure of recidivism. *See, e.g.*, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010 at 1 (2014) (measuring recidivism by re-arrest rates); *see also id.* at 14 (discussing other measure of recidivism in addition to re-arrest rates). Using re-arrest as indicating that a new crime has been committed is the conventional approach to measuring reoffending used by other researchers in this area. *See, e.g.*, Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, *Predicting Violence*, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 513-24 (2012) (reviewing previous research on predictions of violence in other pretrial release studies). Indeed, because only a fraction of criminals committing crimes are arrested, this approach significantly undercounts the actual costs of crimes committed by pretrial releasees. *See infra* note 151 and accompanying text.

⁶² BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 6, at 36.

has undercounted the number of crimes committed by pretrial releasees. Finally, the Study has failed to capture all costs to public safety from the changes, particularly in the area of domestic violence.

A. Crimes Committed by Pretrial Releasees Appear to Have Increased After Pretrial Release Was Expanded.

The Bail Reform Study sought to compare crimes committed by pretrial releasees during the fifteen months before G.O. 18.8A and the fifteen months after. As discussed above, difficulties exist with such an approach, such as confounding influences from rising or falling overall crime rates. But even simply adopting this approach, the Study's data suggests that, contrary to the Study's assertions, the pretrial release changes likely placed Cook County's public at greater risk of crimes from pretrial releasees.

The Bail Reform Study reported figures for the number of defendants who "remained crime-free" in both the fifteen months before G.O. 18.8A and the fifteen-months after—i.e., the number of defendants who were not charged in Cook County for another crime after their initial bail hearing date.⁶³ Based on this data, the Study concluded that "considerable stability" existed in "community safety rates" comparing the pre- and post-implementation periods.⁶⁴ Indeed, the Study highlighted "community safety rates" that were about the same (or even better) following G.O. 18.8A's implementation. The Study reported, for example, that the "community safety rate" for male defendants who were released improved from 81.2% before to 82.5% after; and for female defendants, the community safety rate improved from 85.7% to 86.5%.⁶⁵ Combining the male and female figures produces the result that the overall community safety rate improved from 81.8% before implementation of the changes to 83.0% after.

But while the concept of a "community safety rate" might be useful in other contexts, it is not necessarily the best measure for effects on public safety of changes in pretrial release policies. When it comes to public safety, the public is concerned about the number of crimes that released defendants commit in the community, not a safety "rate" that can vary depending on the denominator.

A simple illustration will prove this point. Suppose that a community implements changes to pretrial release procedures such that (as in Cook County) more defendants are released before trial—but the "community safety rate" remains stable. If the community releases 100 defendants before the changes and 150 defendants after the changes, with a stable "community safety rate" of 80%, then

⁶³ *Id.* at 33; *see id.* at 30 n.16 (defining "community safety rate").

⁶⁴ *Id.*

⁶⁵ *Id.* at 33 (Table 7B).

that community will suffer more crime after the changes. Specifically, the total number of crimes suffered will increase from 20 crimes before the change to 30 crimes after the change.⁶⁶

Turning from this simple illustration to the data reported in the Bail Reform Study, the number of defendants released pretrial increased from 20,435 in the “before” period to 24,504 in the “after” period—about a 20% increase. So even though the “community safety rate” remained roughly stable (and even improved very slightly), the total number of crimes committed by pretrial releasees increased after G.O. 18.8A. In the fifteen months before G.O.18.8A, 20,435 defendants were released⁶⁷ and 16,720 remained “crime-free”⁶⁸—and, thus, arithmetically (although this number is not directly disclosed in the Study), 3,715 defendants were charged with committing new crimes while they were released. In the fifteen months after G.O. 18.8A, 24,504 defendants were released,⁶⁹ and 20,340 remained “crime-free”⁷⁰—and, thus, arithmetically, 4,164 defendants were charged with committing new crimes while they were released. Directly comparing the before and after numbers shows a clear increase from 3,715 defendants who were charged with committing new crimes before to 4,164 after—a 12% increase.

While one can debate whether a 12% rise in the number of crimes is significant, the growth contradicts the study’s assertion that crime did not increase after G.O. 18.8A. Moreover, it turns out that this figure understates the number of additional crimes that likely occurred during the “after” period. The Bail Reform Study acknowledged that defendants with initial bail hearings before the changes spent significantly more time released into the community than defendants from the post-implementation period—an average of 243 days before compared to 154 days after.⁷¹ The reason for these differing time periods is not a real-world difference between the two populations but merely an artifact of the Study’s construction. The Study’s authors decided to report data on the “after” period very rapidly—and, as a consequence of this methodology, the authors reported data before the cases in the after period had fully run their course. The fifteen-month “after” period in the Study

⁶⁶ This simple illustration assumes that the community has not had any significant change in population between the before and after period. This assumption appears to be roughly correct for Cook County, Illinois, during the 30-month period of time in which G.O. 18.8A was studied, where recent year-to-year population changes have been declines of a little under 0.5%. See <http://worldpopulationreview.com/us-counties/il/cook-county-population/> (visited Jan. 24, 2020).

⁶⁷ 17,431 males + 3,004 females = 20,435 total defendants released. See BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 6, at 33 (Table 7B).

⁶⁸ 14,146 males + 2,574 females = 16,720 crime free released defendants. See *id.*

⁶⁹ 21,326 males + 3,178 females = 24,504 total defendants released. See *id.*

⁷⁰ 17,591 crime-free males + 2,749 crime-free females = 20,340 total crime-free defendants. See *id.*

⁷¹ *Id.* at 30.

ended on December 31, 2018, and the Study closed its analysis of those released defendants just two months later (on February 28, 2019).⁷² In contrast, the fifteen-month “before” period in the study ended on September 30, 2017—and the study continued its analysis of those defendants for a much longer time. For example, a defendant who was released on the last day of the before period would have been reviewed for seventeen months to determine if he was re-arrested; in contrast, a defendant who was released on the last day of the after period would have been reviewed for just two months to determine if he was re-arrested.⁷³

It appears to be generally accepted that the longer a criminal defendant is free on the streets, the greater the possibility that the defendant will commit a crime—i.e., will recidivate. While there does not appear to be a great deal of literature on specific times frames for recidivism by pretrial releasees, the empirical literature on recidivism by prison releasees consistently shows that the longer time over which recidivism is observed, the greater the chance of finding recidivism. For example, a study measuring recidivism over a one-year time frame will find a lower rate of recidivism than over a three-year time frame or nine-year time frame.⁷⁴

Because the Bail Reform Study allowed the pre-implementation defendants more time to commit additional crimes than the post-implementation defendants, the Study’s construction skewed the results towards finding a lower recidivism rate after General Order 18.8A. It is not an apples-to-apples comparison to look at one group of defendants who were released for, on average, 243 days and then to compare them to another group of defendants who were released for, on average, 154 days. The second group will, other things being equal, undoubtedly commit fewer additional crimes simply because they have had less time to commit such crimes.

Given this disparity, it is appropriate to ask what would we expect to have been the total number of “after” pretrial releasees committing crimes if the Bail Reform Study had been extended until the average number of days for the “after” releasees was the same as for the “before” releasees—i.e., if an average period of 243 days had existed for both the before and after parts of the Study to measure releasees committing crimes? This figure is straightforward to estimate. We can simply divide 243 by 154 to come up with 1.57—i.e., the before period involved releasees who were on the street for about 57% more time. According to the Study, after the reform, during the days that they were released, a total of 4,164 defendants released pretrial were charged with committing new crimes.⁷⁵ So if we take this number of

⁷² *Id.*

⁷³ *Id.*

⁷⁴ *See, e.g.*, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: 2018 UPDATE ON PRISONER RECIDIVISM: A 9-YEAR FOLLOW-UP PERIOD 4 (2018).

⁷⁵ Subtracting total defendants from “crime-free” defendants, i.e., 17,591 crime-free males + 2,749 crime-free females = 20,340 total crime-free defendants, which can be subtracted from

after defendants committing new crimes (4,164) and assume that if the releasees had been measured for a 57% longer period, one conclusion might be that we would expect a 57% increase in crimes over this period.

However, this approach of using a 57% increase assumes a constant (i.e., linear) rate of re-offending over time for the group of pretrial releasees in question. Is this assumption accurate? We are unaware of any study providing a precise timeline for month-to-month re-offending among pretrial releasees. However, a comprehensive Bureau of Justice Statistics study on recidivism rates over time for releasees from prison includes recidivism data in six-month increments.⁷⁶ That study shows a slightly declining rate of recidivism. So using a straight-line, linear figure of 57% may somewhat overstate the rate at which recidivism occurred among the “after” pretrial releasees.

Using this Bureau of Justice Statistics study of recidivism by prisoners released from prison, more than a third (36.8%) of all released prisoners who were arrested within five years of release were arrested within the first six months, with more than half (56.7%) arrested by the end of the first year.⁷⁷ It is possible to take these numbers and fit a slightly declining polynomial value to the recidivism rate—and then estimate what number of defendants would have been discovered committing crimes. Applying this polynomial value to the Cook County data to correct for slightly declining recidivism rates over time produces the result that we would expect a 45% increase in the number of crimes in the “after” period had the releasees been observed for the same length of time as the “before” period.⁷⁸

Interestingly, after we had made the calculation set out in the previous paragraph, we were able to find data on recidivism among Cook County pretrial releasees—data that corresponds (although is somewhat lower) than the estimate set out above. The Cook County courts maintain a “dashboard” of statistics regarding

24,504 released defendants to produce the result that 4,164 defendants were not crime-free. See BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 6, at 33 (Table 7B).

⁷⁶ U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010 (2014).

⁷⁷ *Id.* at 7.

⁷⁸ The linear recidivism detection rate is based on fitting a line at the two points (0,0) and (6,36.8). The polynomial rate is based on fitting the three values of (0,0), (6, 36.8), and (12, 57.6). We use 240 days rather than 243 days for convenience, since that is a (roughly) eight-month period of time. A linear extrapolation of the total number of crimes that would be expected to have been committed by defendants released after the reform – had they been studied for the same number of days as the defendants released before the reform – produces a figure of 6,537 crimes (1.57 x 4,164). This figure then drops down slightly to 92.76% (45.499/49.048) of the linear figure. Put another way, $1.57 \times .927 = 1.455$ – i.e., the appropriate correction for the shorter observation period is to increase the number crimes observed by about 45.5%. In turn $1.455 \times 4,164 = 6,058.6$ – the figure reported in text.

the new pretrial release measures.⁷⁹ These statistics report whether pretrial releases have been charged with a new offense while released. These statistics show the “community safety” rate—from which it is a simple matter to determine an inverse “community safety failure” rate. For example, a “community safety” rate of 90% means a “community safety failure” rate of 10%.

The Cook County dashboard tabulates information by quarter,⁸⁰ so it is possible to review the failure rate in the “after” period on quarter-by-quarter. It is also possible to estimate the recidivism rate on a quarter-by quarter-basis, as shown in Table 1 below.

TABLE 1 - COOK COUNTY - COMMUNITY SAFETY FAILURE RATE

Year (in quarterly increments)	Public Safety Failure Rate	Number of Defendants Released	Total New Crimes	1Q Dft’s (and failure rate)	2Q Dft’s (and failure rate)	3Q Dft’s (and failure rate)	4Q Dft’s (and failure rate)	5Q Dft’s (and failure rate)
Q4 2017	5.9%	4,378	258	4,378 (.0625)				
Q1 2018	9.1%	9,199	837	4,281 (.0625)	4,378 (0.0575)			
Q2 2018	11.4%	13,985	1,594	4,786 (.0625)	4,281 (0.0575)	4,378 (0.045)		
Q3 2018	13.2%	19,711	2,602	5,726 (.0625)	4,786 (0.0575)	4,281 (0.045)	4,378 (0.040)	
Q4 2018	15.3%	24,534	3,754	4,823 (.0625)	5,726 (0.575)	4,786 (0.045)	4,281 (0.040)	4,378 (0.020)

Source: Data from Circuit Court of Cook County, Model Bond Court Initiative, Data Dashboards (various quarters from 2017 through 2018).

What this table shows is the community safety failure rate from October 1, 2017 (the beginning of the Study’s “after” period) through December 1, 2018—roughly the end of the “after” period, although the releases were followed for an additional two months, through February 28, 2019. For example, in the fourth quarter (Q4) of 2017, 4,378 defendants were released, and 5.9% recidivated (i.e.,

⁷⁹ <http://www.cookcountycourt.org/HOME/ModelBondCourtInitiative.aspx>.

⁸⁰ *See id.* (reporting data on “community safety rate,” as measured by felony defendants who appeared in bond court and were released after October 1, 2017 and had not been charged with a new offense while in the community”).

failed by being charged with new crimes) during that quarter—producing 258 additional crimes. In the next quarter—the first quarter of 2018, an additional 4,821 defendants were released, bringing the total of released defendants under the new pretrial release initiative to 9,199 (as shown in the table). At this time, the total number of new crimes committed by pretrial releasees was 837, which is the sum of the new crimes committed by those who had been out on the streets for one quarter and those who had been out on the streets for two quarters.

Examining the data for the five quarters from the fourth quarter of 2017 through the fourth quarter of 2018, we were able to estimate a decaying recidivism function that best explained the actual data above on a quarter-by-quarter basis. This function was calibrated using Cook County pretrial release data with a focus on both the marginal and total public safety failure rates. Our method minimized the discrepancy between the actual and fitted number of total failures over the five-quarter span. We estimated that defendants out for one quarter had a recidivism rate of 6.25% during that first quarter, 5.75% during the second quarter, 4.5% during the third quarter, 4.0% during the fourth quarter, and 2.0% during the fifth quarter. The total of number of new crimes is simply a function of the number of defendants who have been released in each quarter multiplied by the estimated recidivism rate for each quarter during which they were released. Our fitted model matches the observed recidivism rate for the first five quarters of the new pretrial release procedures—a total of new crimes of 3,754 were observed from pretrial releases during those five quarters, and the same number would be estimated by our model. We believe that this is a conservative estimate, as we have included all five quarters in our model (i.e., fourth quarter 2017 through fourth quarter 2018) even though reasons exist for believe that the new pretrial release procedures took some time to phase-in and implement.⁸¹

With our model in hand, we can more accurately derive a figure for the undercount that resulting from the Bail Reform Study’s decision to observe defendants only through February 28, 2019. Our model enables us to estimate how many additional crimes would have been observed if the “after” defendants who were released following G.O. 18.8A had been observed through the end of 2019. Observing these “after” defendants through the end of the year would have been about the same amount of time that the “before” defendants were observed, although (here again) our approach is slightly conservative (i.e., produces a lower number of a crimes in the “after” group than was likely actually the case).⁸² In other words, our

⁸¹ See Kiran Misra, *Shifting Fronts in Bail Reform: Despite Reform Effort, the Pretrial Detention System Still Causes Harm*, Southside Weekly, Mar. 6, 2019, available at <https://southsideweekly.com/shifting-fronts-bail-reform/>.

⁸² The “before” period in the study ended on September 30, 2017 and data collection in the study ended on February 28, 2018. Thus, new crimes committed by the “before” defendants were apparently collected for a seventeen-month period. Our approach allows an estimate

approach has the effect of roughly equalizing the 243 day observation period for the “before” defendants with a comparable observation period for the “after” defendants.⁸³

Our model estimates that an additional 1,753 crimes were committed during 2019, and that 1,212 of these would have occurred after February 28, 2019.⁸⁴ In other words, we estimate that the Bail Reform Study undercounted the number of crimes committed by pretrial releasees in the “after” period by 1,212 crimes.

Using the additional crimes estimated above, we can then calculate a corrected figure of “after” crimes moving from an observed 4,164 to an estimated 5,376.⁸⁵ Thus, the corrected figure suggested that the Study’s figures should be increased by 29% to correct for the undercount.⁸⁶ In other words, a reasonable (and conservative) estimate is that, if the Study’s authors had not artificially truncated the time during which they had studied the rates of re-arrest for pretrial releasees after G.O. 18.8A, then that group of releasees would have been found to have committed 5,378 crimes.

With this figure in place, we can directly compare the 3,715 defendants who were charged with committing new crimes in the “before” period to an estimated 5,376 defendants in the “after” period to tentatively conclude that G.O.18.8A produced an additional 1,661 pretrial releasees who committed a crime after their release⁸⁷—a 45% increase from the “before” period.⁸⁸ This is different than the reported information in the Study, as shown in Figure 1 below.

of crimes committed by the “after” defendants for a shorter, twelve-month period, i.e., all of 2019.

⁸³ The alert reader may wonder why, if the “before” observation period was 243 days, we have chosen an after “observation” period of 365 days (i.e., all of 2019). The answer is that while our model observes (i.e., predicts) crimes committed throughout all of 2019, it allows for some percentage of defendant to be finally adjudicated during the year—just some percentage of defendants were finally adjudicated during the “before” period. Again, our approach is conservative (i.e., produces a lower number of crimes than were actually committed by the “after” defendants) for the reasons explained in the previous footnote.

⁸⁴ Our model produces 810 additional crimes in Q1 2019, 541 additional crimes in Q2 2019, 306 additional crimes in Q3 2019, and 96 additional crimes in Q4 2019. We then assume that the Bail Reform Study captured 2/3rds of the crimes in Q1 2019 (i.e., January and February 2019, but not March of 2019), and estimate that 269 crimes were committed in March 2019 ($1/3 \times 810$).

⁸⁵ $4,164 + 1,212 = 5,376$. This is a more conservative estimate than the linear function or the polynomial function discussed above would have produced.


⁸⁶ $5,376 \div 4,164 = 1.291$.

⁸⁷ $5,376$ estimated/projected releasees committing crimes in the “after” period - 3,715 releasees committing crimes in the “before” period.

⁸⁸ $5,376 \div 3,715 = 1.447$.

Figure 1

Crimes By Pre-Trial Release Before and After Chicago Bail Reform



One question that immediately arises is whether that 45% difference can be attributed to some difference between the “before” period and the “after” period. Interestingly, the Study itself disclaims any such difference. The Study notes a slight increase in filings between the “before” and “after” periods: Filings went up modestly from the “before” period to the “after” by about 6.6%.⁸⁹ But other than that change, the Study reported that basic age, gender, and race/ethnicity data remained stable over both periods.⁹⁰ Also, the Study reported that cases factors and PSA risk measures remained stable between both periods.⁹¹

Nor does the change appear to be attributable to an external increase in crime due to other factors apart from changes in pretrial release procedures. For example, in 2018 (the bulk of the “after” period), crime declined in Chicago⁹² by 8% compared to 2017, continuing a downward trend of declining by 10% since 2016.⁹³ Thus, if

⁸⁹ 30,432 felony hearing cases after compared to 28,547 cases before. BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 6, at 8 (Table 1B).

⁹⁰ *Id.* at 8.

⁹¹ *Id.* at 28.

⁹² Cook County is, of course, a larger area than Chicago. But Chicago’s population is a majority of the Cook County population and, we understand, a majority of the crimes committed in Cook County are committed in Chicago. As with the Bail Reform Study, given the greater accessibility of Chicago crime data, we use Chicago figures here, believing that they will track trends in Cook County. *Cf.* BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 6, at 1 n.3 (using Chicago crime data).

⁹³ CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, END-OF-YEAR CRIME STATISTICS: 2018, available at

anything, we would expect that downward trends in overall crime rates would be matched by a similar downward trend in crime by pretrial releasees. Instead, the opposite appears to have occurred, as crimes by pretrial releasees appear to have increased in the “after” period.

B. Violent Crimes Committed by Pretrial Releasees Appear to Have Increased After Pretrial Release Was Expanded.

The numbers discussed so far have involved defendants who recidivated as measured by being charged in Cook County with a new crime of any type.⁹⁴ Of course, not all crimes are equally serious. Of particular interest is whether pretrial releasees committed additional *violent* crimes.

The most widely publicized figure from the Bail Reform Study is that only 0.6% of pretrial releasees committed another violent crime after G.O. 18.8A, compared to 0.7% before. Drilling down into this number, however, produces significant cause for concern. To begin with, one of the features of G.O. 18.8A was that it led to more defendants being released. Accordingly, even if the percentage of defendants who committed violent crimes remained stable over the two periods, we would expect an increase in the violent crimes simply because more defendants were released.

And it turns out good reasons exist for concluding that pretrial releasees committed more violent crimes after G.O. 18.8A than before. Although the Study does not report this figure (or other raw numbers of violent crimes), a figure for violent crimes can be straightforwardly derived. The number of violent crimes committed by pretrial releasees in the fifteen months before G.O. 18.8A was about 143; the number in the fifteen months after was about 147.⁹⁵

But as just discussed above, the “before” and “after” periods during which pretrial releasees were observed were not identical—the difference between the 243-day observation period “before” versus the 154-day observation period “after.” As also discussed above in connection with additional *total* crimes committed by pretrial releasees, it is possible to correct for these different observation periods in calculating additional *violent* crimes they committed. Adjusting for this difference, instead of the 147 violent crimes committed after G.O. 18.8A, it is reasonable to


<https://home.chicagopolice.org/cpd-end-of-year-crime-statistics-2018/> (visited at January 23, 2020). Chicago is a component part of Cook County and accounts for most its crime. We do not immediately have available to us Cook County crime statistics for the relevant periods, so we used Chicago statistics as indicative of general trends in the area.

⁹⁴ See BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 6, at 30 n.16.

⁹⁵ 20,435 released before x 0.7% = 143.0; 24,504 x 0.6% = 147.0.

estimate that pretrial releasees committed 190 violent crimes.⁹⁶ This means that, based on our estimation, new violent crimes charged against pretrial releasees went from 143 before G.O 18.8A to 190 after—an increase of 70 violent crimes or about a 33% increase in the number of violent crimes after the new pretrial release procedures, as shown in Figure 2 below.⁹⁷

Figure 2
Violent Crimes By Pre-Trial Release Before and After Chicago Bail Reform



The fact that the total number of violent crimes increased after G.O. 18.8A is hardly surprising, given that more dangerous defendants are being released under G.O. 18.8A. It does appear that the Public Safety Assessment (PSA) has at least some modest predictive value of new criminal activity.⁹⁸ And yet, G.O. 18.8A made it much easier for defendants to be released even if their PSA score was concerning. As one example, according to data in the Study, the number of defendants with a “violence flag” who nonetheless secured their pretrial release increased from 747 in

⁹⁶ $147 \times 1.2915 = 189.8$. See *supra* note 86 and accompanying text (deriving the 1.2915 figure for adjusted reported additional crimes in the Study to estimated actual crimes in the Study). As discussed in the next section, this number for total “violent” crimes is substantially lower than the number of crimes actually involving violence committed by pretrial releasees. In addition, because violent crime cases may take longer to work their way through the system and be charged, our lagged recidivism model may slightly *understate* recidivism for those charged with violent crimes. These two facts may render our calculation here somewhat conservative (i.e., lower) than the actual number of violent crimes.

⁹⁷ $190 \div 143 = 1.328$.

⁹⁸ See BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 2, at 32 (presenting data showing a slightly declining community safety rate with increases in New Criminal Activity Score).

the “before” period to 1,038 in the “after” period—a 39% increase.⁹⁹ Put another way, before G.O. 18.8A, 33.6% of those with a violence flag were released; after G.O. 18.8A, 40.2% with a violence flag were released. If the PSA has any predictive value, one would expect to find an increase in violence as a result of these release decisions—which is what our estimated number reported above suggest.

G.O. 18.8A also lead to a significant increase in the release of defendants charged with grave offenses, including defendants charged with violent crimes and gun crimes. The percentage of released defendants charged with violent crimes increased from 43.2% to 46.5%; the percentage of released defendants charged with crimes against the person increased from 48.8% to 61.6%; and, perhaps most concerning for an area flooded with gun violence, the percentage of released defendants charged with weapons offenses increased from 60.6% to 76.4%.¹⁰⁰

Given the high cost of shooting crimes, a brief illustration of how the new procedures operate in practice might be useful. A Chicago TV station (WGN-TV) investigated every felony gun case committed during two of Chicago’s historically most violent weekends in 2019: Memorial Day and Labor Day. The station found that

- A total of 118 adults were charged with felony weapons offenses.
- 87 percent were released on bond. The most anyone had to pay to get out of jail before trial was \$5,000.
- 72 percent were released the same they day they were arrested, or the very next day.
- 30 percent walked out of jail without paying any money – they received I-Bonds (individual recognizance bonds).¹⁰¹

This seems like a very high rate of release of defendants who might be assumed to pose a danger to the community.

Other bail studies have suggested, unsurprisingly, that those who are denied pretrial release are generally more dangerous than those who were released. For example, John Goldkamp examined emergency releases of inmates and found that the incremental releases involved more dangerous inmates.¹⁰² And it appears to be the case that a defendant facing a charge of a violent crime is, if rearrested, more

⁹⁹ See *id.* at 35 (Figure 14).

¹⁰⁰ See *id.* at 25 (Table 4A).

¹⁰¹ <https://wgntv.com/2019/10/08/chicago-police-question-bail-in-gun-cases/>.

¹⁰² John S. Goldkamp, *Questioning the Practice of Pretrial Detention: Some Empirical Evidence from Philadelphia*, 74 J. CRIM. L. & Criminology 1556, 1586 (1983). See generally Baradaran & McIntyre, *supra* note 61, at 526, 541-44.

likely to be arrested for a crime of violence.¹⁰³ To be sure, these rates of rearrest are likely to be “low”—i.e., a small percentage. But even a “low” rearrest rate means an increased number of crimes. It should come as no surprise, then, that as Cook County decided to release more pretrial detainees charged with violent and potentially violent crimes, the result was that additional violent crimes were committed.

C. The Data from Bail Reform Study Appears to Have Significantly Undercounted Violent Crimes Committed by Pretrial Releasees.

Obviously, it would be useful to know more about the kinds of violent crimes that increased after G.O. 18.8A. The Study’s definition of “violent” crimes was confined to “murder, attempted murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated battery.”¹⁰⁴ As result, serious charges involving weapons (including unlawful possession or use of a firearm) were excluded.¹⁰⁵ But even using the Study’s own definition of violent crimes, the Study fails to report data on precisely what kinds of violent crimes pretrial releasees committed.¹⁰⁶

Even more concerning, however, a very recent investigative report by the *Chicago Tribune* casts doubt on the whether Bail Reform Study fully captured all of the violent crimes caused by Cook County new and more generous pretrial release procedures. While the Study does not provide a crime-by-crime breakdown of what crimes were committed by pretrial releasees, it does contain several explanatory sentences about the violent crime of greatest interest: murder. The Study reports that, during the post-implementation period, nine defendants were charged with murder.¹⁰⁷ The Study goes on to report that, of those nine, six had committed their murders before their original bail hearing dates.¹⁰⁸ Apparently these six cases involved situations where someone had committed a murder, was later arrested on a different crime, released on bond, and then was subsequently charged with the murder. Of course, murders can take considerable time to investigate, and this lag time between the commission of a murder and the subsequent filing of criminal charges could mean that the murderer (while under investigation) would have subsequent interactions with the criminal justice system. It would not be fair, of

¹⁰³ See Baradaran & McIntyre, *supra* note 61, at 528-29 (finding that “defendants charged initially with violent crimes were much more likely to be rearrested for violent crimes”).

¹⁰⁴ BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 6, at 5. This is the same definition employed by the FBI’s *Uniform Crime Report* for violent crimes.

¹⁰⁵ See BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 6, at 5.

¹⁰⁶ The Study does have an appendix, available online, reporting data for the community safety rate for pretrial defendants broken down into various categories. See *id.* at 39 (discussing Appendix, Table 4). But that appendix does not contain data on the kinds of crimes that pretrial releasees committed, as it reports only data for “no new criminal activity” and “new criminal activity.” See *id.*

¹⁰⁷ *Id.* at 36.

¹⁰⁸ *Id.*

course, to attribute a murder such as this to someone being released on bond—the murder had occurred before the release decision. This clarification removed six of the nine murders committed in the post-implementation period and seemingly left only three murders committed by pretrial releases during the “after” study period in the Study. This was what the Study’s authors reported.¹⁰⁹

Three reporters at the *Chicago Tribune* (David Jackson, Todd Lighty, and Gary Marx) investigated this assertion in greater depth.¹¹⁰ Digging more deeply into Chicago’s homicide numbers, the reporters used Chicago police data to identify all adults charged with a Chicago homicide since the G.O. 18.8A, then accessed criminal court data to determine whether these adults were out on bail at the time.¹¹¹ Those records showed 21 defendants were charged with killing people while they were out on pretrial bond for other pending charges during the fifteen month period after G.O. 18.8A (i.e., during October 1, 2017 through December 31, 2018). Sixteen of those 21 accused murdered were out on bail awaiting trial for felony charges including attempted murder.¹¹² The other five defendants had been bonded out on misdemeanor crimes.¹¹³ Yet four of the five had felony backgrounds and three of them had done prison stints: One had violated his current bond, one was charged with street gang contacts as a parolee.

The reporters were also able to explain the dramatic disparity between the three homicides disclosed in the Study and the 21 identified by the *Tribune*’s investigation. The reasons for the dramatic undercount varied from case to case, but included:

- The Study included only those defendants whose initial charge was a felony; it excluded those charged with a misdemeanor, which is far more common. Five of the murder defendants found by the *Tribune* had bonded out of jail on misdemeanor charges. Four of them had past felony convictions from attempted murder to armed robbery, and three had served prison time.
- The Study counted only the first new charge against defendants after they were released from custody. The *Tribune* identified two people who were released, charged with another crime, released again and then charged with murder, all within the time period being examined. Those later murder charges were not entered into the database used for the report.

¹⁰⁹ *Id.* at 36-37.

¹¹⁰ David Jackson, Todd Lighty, & Gary Marx, *Bail Reform Analysis by Cook County Chief Judge Based on Flawed Data, Undercounts New Murder Charges*, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 13, 2020, available at <https://www.chicagotribune.com/investigations/ct-cook-county-bail-bond-reform-tim-evans-20200213-tkodxevlyvcp7k66q2v2ahboi4-story.html>.

¹¹¹ *Id.*

¹¹² *Id.*

¹¹³ *Id.*

- The Study excluded three murder defendants whose first charge occurred before bail reform even though they were released on bond after the reforms took effect in September 2017.
- Data entry mistakes and incomplete court records marred the data set used in the analysis.¹¹⁴

Of course, these 21 cases involve only a tiny fraction of the Study’s data set. But there is every reason for thinking that such problems permeate the rest of the Study’s dataset. Indeed, more broadly than the specific problems identified in these 21 cases, it appears that the Study used a narrowly defined definition for pretrial “releasees” as including only defendants released at their *initial* bond hearing¹¹⁵—not those who were released in subsequent court hearings, as likely happens frequently in Cook County criminal courts. This maneuver no doubt had the effect of moving a number of crimes committed by defendants who had, in fact, been released pretrial from the Study’s category for “defendants released pretrial”¹¹⁶ and into a category for defendants who had not secured release.¹¹⁷

Using this narrow classification is indefensible from the perspective of obtaining reliable information for making public policy decisions. Clearly G.O. 18.8A applies, not just release decisions made at the initial bond hearing, but to *all* release decisions.¹¹⁸ Indeed, because violent crimes cases are typically more complicated than other crimes, it would not be surprising to find that release decisions in such cases took multiple hearings—in contrast to simpler cases where release determinations could be made more rapidly. The Bail Reform Study’s restriction of examining only “releasees” at the initial hearing likely concealed a significant number of violent crimes that were committed by persons who, in fact, were able to obtain release.

The *Tribune* also analyzed the Study’s use of a narrow definition of “violent crime,” counting only the crimes of murder (or attempted murder or non-negligent manslaughter), rape, robbery, and aggravated battery.¹¹⁹ While this definition

¹¹⁴ *Id.*

¹¹⁵ See BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 6, at 7 (reporting data on the “initial felony bail hearing population”).

¹¹⁶ See, e.g., *id.* at 33 (reporting data on “defendants released pretrial” and then the number of those defendants who “remained charge free”).

¹¹⁷ Jackson, Lighty & Marx, *supra* note 110.

¹¹⁸ See G.O. 18.8A, ¶ 1 (“This order applies to all ruling on bail . . . including rulings on review of prior bail decisions . . .”), available at <http://www.cookcountycourt.org/Manage/DivisionOrders/ViewDivisionOrder/tabid/298/ArticleId/2562/GENERAL-ORDER-NO-18-8A-Procedures-for-Bail-Hearings-and-Pretrial-Release.aspx>.

¹¹⁹ See BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 6, at 5.

largely tracks the FBI's *Uniform Crime Reports*,¹²⁰ it excludes many crimes that would commonly be viewed as violent, including domestic battery, battery, assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and armed violence. For purposes of this article, we will refer to this broader definition as "crimes against persons." If crimes such as these were included in the count of crimes committed by pretrial releasees, then the total number of "crimes against persons" would have been at least four times greater than the number of "violent" crimes.¹²¹

Using the *Tribune's* more fulsome definition of crimes against persons, we can estimate how many additional such crimes were committed as the result of Cook County's expanded release procedures. Taking our figure of 70 additional violent crimes based on the Bail Reform Study's definition and simply multiplying by 400% produces the reasonable estimate that at least 280 additional crimes against persons were committed by the defendants released after G.O. 18.8A than before.¹²²

D. Prosecutors Dropped Aggravated Domestic Violence Cases More Frequently After the Bail Changes.

Another serious defect in the Bail Reform Study's data deserves a brief mention. In May 2019 (about the same time as the Bail Reform Study was released), two reporters at the *Chicago Tribune* (David Jackson and Madeline Buckley) compared Cook County domestic violence cases in 2016 (before G.O. 18.8A) with those in 2018 (after G.O. 18.8A was in effect).¹²³ Focusing on the most serious cases (aggravated domestic batteries), the reporters found that it was easier for defendants accused of aggravated domestic batteries to obtain pretrial release after bail reform. In 2016, the average bond per defendant accused of such attacks was \$63,859; in 2018, the average bond was \$13,505.¹²⁴ In addition, the percentage of defendants

¹²⁰ The *Uniform Crime Reports* counts all "aggravated assaults," a category that might be slightly different than the Study's "aggravated battery" category.

¹²¹ Jackson, Lighty & Marx, *supra* note 110.

¹²² To be clear, just as we use an expanded definition of "crimes against persons" in the "after" period, for consistency we would also need to use that expanded definition in the "before" period. We simply assume that the percentage of such crimes would have been the same in both periods, permitting us to simply multiply by the 400% expansion figure derived by the *Chicago Tribune* to arrive at the figure cited in text above.

¹²³ David Jackson & Madeline Buckley, Domestic Violence Victims Face Risk of Being Attacked Again Following Cook County Reforms, a Tribune Investigation Found, CHI. TRIB., May 2, 2019, available at <https://www.chicagotribune.com/investigations/ct-met-domestic-violence-bonds-20190219-story.html> (visited Jan. 24, 2020) (hereinafter "CHI. TRIB. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INVESTIGATION").

¹²⁴ *Id.*

who were released on their own recognizance¹²⁵ essentially doubled, from 10% of all defendants to 19% of all defendants.¹²⁶

Given the dynamics of domestic violence cases, it would seem logical that if more domestic defendants were released pretrial, then they would be able to place increased pressure on their victims not to continue to support prosecution – leading to an increase in the number of domestic violence prosecutions that would be dropped. It is widely recognized that domestic “[b]atterers put hydraulic pressures on domestic violence victims to recant, drop the case, or fail to appear at trial.”¹²⁷ Consistent with what that logic would predict, the *Tribune* reporters discovered that the percentage of aggravated domestic battery cases that prosecutors dropped increased from 56% of all cases in 2016 (before G.O. 18.8A) to 70% of all cases in 2018 (when G.O. 18.8A was in effect).

The *Tribune* also provided a reason why the new approach to pretrial release might have particularly harmed the prosecution of serious cases. As the bail reform efforts developed in Cook County, they relied on the Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety Assessment (PSA).¹²⁸ But while that assessment sets out restrictive guidelines for releasing persons charged with certain violent offenses (murder, sexual assault, and robbery), it fails to provide similar restrictions for domestic violence crimes.¹²⁹ Moreover, the Arnold PSA does not take into account current or prior protective orders; nor does it consider a defendant’s violation of those orders as a risk factor.¹³⁰ While the Arnold Foundation is planning a research initiative to explore whether domestic violence cases should receive different treatment in the future,¹³¹ as the PSA operated during the Bail Reform Study, it appears to have significantly underprotected victims of aggravated domestic violence, leading to a significant increase in cases that could not be prosecuted, presumably due to witness intimidation by domestic abusers.¹³² This fact prompted the *Chicago Tribune*’s

¹²⁵ In Cook County, such releases are known as an “Individual Recognizance Bond” or “I-Bond.” See BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 6, at 4.

¹²⁶ CHI. TRIB. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INVESTIGATION, *supra* note 123.

¹²⁷ Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, *Let the Truth Be Told: Proposed Hearsay Exceptions to Admit Domestic Violence Victims' Out of Court Statements as Substantive Evidence*, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 4 (2002). See generally DOUGLAS EVAN BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL, MEG GARVIN & STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 473-502 (4th ed. 2018) (reviewing problems with pursuing domestic violence prosecutions).

¹²⁸ See *supra* note 24 and accompanying text.

¹²⁹ CHI. TRIB. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INVESTIGATION, *supra* note 123. For an insightful discussion of how such risk assessments operate (including the Arnold PSA), see BAUGHMAN, *supra* note 1, at 195-99.

¹³⁰ CHI. TRIB. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INVESTIGATION, *supra* note 123.

¹³¹ *Id.*

¹³² When the *Tribune*’s findings were presented to Chief Judge Evans, his Office responded with its own analysis purporting to show that fewer than 6 percent of domestic violence

editorial board to wonder “how promises to be more deft in lower-stakes cases of retail theft or minor drug offenses morphed into a lighter touch with those who allegedly beat or choke their intimate partners or family members.”¹³³

V. THE BAIL REFORM STUDY’S COST-BENEFIT ASSESSMENT.

So far, we have focused on the public safety implications of the General Order 18.8A. In this section, we try to take a step back and briefly ask the broader question of whether, weighing all the costs and benefits, General Order 18.8A was cost-beneficial. The Bail Reform Study asserted that the changes were cost-beneficial, given various financial savings and other benefits that followed from reducing the population of Cook County pretrial detainees. Our conclusion is a cautionary one: We think it is premature to reach broad conclusions about whether the General Order has been a positive or negative change for the Cook County criminal justice system. Instead, a more careful review of issues is necessary before any firm conclusions can be reached. This section discusses some of the data that would be needed to reach firmer conclusions as well as some of the overlooked challenges to determining that bail reforms are truly cost-beneficial.

A. The Need for Reanalysis of the Data Regarding Crimes by Pretrial Releasees.

In publishing the Bail Reform Study, the Office of the Chief Judge of the Cook County Circuit Court boldly pronounced that the Chief Judge’s order had been a success. According to the Study’s opening paragraph, General Order 18.8A had not only “promoted justice” through greater release of defendants before trial, but also “protected public safety” through greater use of no bond orders, producing a net result of no increase in crime.¹³⁴ These are strong claims—and empirical claims that ultimately rest on the reliability of the Study’s data.

Against that backdrop, it is surprising to learn that the Office has previously been reluctant to share the Study’s data with other researchers. In 2019, the *Chicago Tribune* made a concerted effort to obtain the data underlying the Bail Reform

defendants committed a new crime while they were free on pretrial bonds. But this analysis did not include defendants charged with bond violations—only those defendants who formally had new charges filed against them. And even more concerning, Judge Evans did not allow the *Tribune* to examine the case records underlying his analysis, saying that he wanted to protect the privacy of defendants who had not been found guilty of a crime.

¹³³ Editorial Board, *Cook County Jail Reforms Shouldn’t Put Domestic Violence Victims at Risk*, CHI. TRIB., May 6, 2019, available at <https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/editorials/ct-edit-domestic-violence-reform-cook-county-jail-20190506-story.html>.

¹³⁴ BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 6, at 1.

Study.¹³⁵ It requested electronic docketing data for felony criminal defendants in 39,051 cases that occurred from September 18, 2017, through March 31, 2019, thus covering the cases involved in the Bail Reform Study.¹³⁶ But the Chief Judge withheld basic case information for 76% of the cases because the defendants had not yet been convicted.¹³⁷ The effect of this decision was to prevent the *Chicago Tribune* from investigating the claims made in the Bail Reform Study.¹³⁸

On December 23, 2019, the *Chicago Tribune* sought a writ of mandamus from the Illinois Supreme Court, asking it to direct the Cook County courts to produce the records regarding the cases in the study.¹³⁹ The *Tribune's* legal claims were well-founded. The First Amendment guarantees the public a right of access to basic criminal court records, such as court records regarding charges filed, pretrial release decisions, convictions, and other similar information.¹⁴⁰ Rather than contest the matter further, the Office of the Chief Judge has recently agreed to produce at least some of the records¹⁴¹—but because of its delay in the production of the data, analysis of the issue as corresponding been delayed.

The delay in producing the data is disturbing to us because, in our experience as academics, the exchange of data underlying an empirical research study is standard practice. Moreover, if the Chief Judge releases a report claiming that a new policy is a success, he should at least be open to the possibility that his conclusions can be challenged. In any event, now that the underlying data will apparently be released, it will be interesting to see what that data reveals.¹⁴²

But even without looking at the details of the data, based on the information collected in this article, we believe that it is important that the Bail Reform Study be revised and updated (ideally by the Study's authors themselves). Indeed, we join with the *Chicago Tribune*, whose Editorial Board recently wrote: “Certainly this is

¹³⁵ See Complaint for Writ of Mandamus at 2, *Chicago Tribune v. Dorothy Brown and Timothy Evans*, No. ---- (Ill. Supreme Ct. Dec. 23, 2019).

¹³⁶ See *id.* at SR010 (correspondence between *Tribune* and Office of the Chief Judge) (exhibit to mandamus petition).

¹³⁷ See *id.* at 3.

¹³⁸ See Editorial Board, *A Report's Flaws Suggest: Cook County Bail Reforms May Have Endangered the Public*, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 13, 2020 (*Tribune* reporters were “stonewalled repeatedly as they tried to gather the facts” surrounding the Bail Reform Study).

¹³⁹ See *id.* at 1-5.

¹⁴⁰ See, e.g. *Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (II)*, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).

¹⁴¹ Todd Lighty, David Jackson & Gary Marx, *Cook County Chief Judge Withheld Key Court Data; Under Tribune Pressure, He's Reversed That Policy*, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 13, 2020.

¹⁴² See *id.* (the Chief Judge plans to release complete records “in the coming weeks and months”). We plan to try and obtain the data from the Office of the Chief Judge and review it in the future as well.

clear: [The Chief Judge’s Report] evalting his own program is deficient and therefore of limited value. Withdraw and redo it, Your Honor.”¹⁴³

Beyond those general sentiments, we believe that it would be appropriate for the Study’s authors to undertake a reanalysis in the following specific areas:

1. Rather than using different fifteen-month periods that do not include the same number of warm weather (i.e., high crime) months, the Bail Reform Study data should be reported based on identical one-year “before” and “after” periods. Specifically, the “before” period should be October 1, 2016, through September 30, 2017; the “after” period should be October 1, 2017, through September 30, 2018. This would eliminate the problem with the current report that the “before” period contains five warm weather months while the after period contains only three warm weath months.¹⁴⁴
2. The data in the Bail Reform Study on “crime-free” defendants should be reanalyzed, so that any new charges filed up through February 1, 2020 are included. As discussed above, the “after” period in the current study ran from October 1, 2017, through December 1, 2018—but then analysis of whether pretrial releasees had committed any crimes terminated just two months later—at the end of February 2019. The net result of this approach was that the defendants released in the “after” period were studied for a much shorter period than were the defendants released in the “before” period—skewing the findings towards concluding that fewer crimes had been committed after General Order 18.8A. Whatever the merits of that approach might have been last year, now that an additional year has passed, it should be easy to extend the study observation period for that additional year. This would eliminate the skewing effect by producing greater similarity between the length of time that data on new crimes charged against pretrial releasees were collected in both the “before” and “after” periods.¹⁴⁵
3. The Bail Reform Study should expand its definition of a “pretrial releasee” to include anyone who is released pretrial. In its current iteration, the Study apparentlyl only considers someone to have

¹⁴³ See Editorial Board, *A Report’s Flaws Suggest: Cook County Bail Reforms May Have Endangered the Public*, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 13, 2020

¹⁴⁴ See *supra* notes 55-60 and accompanying text.

¹⁴⁵ See *supra* notes 71-83 and accompanying text.

been released pretrial if that release occurred at the initial bond hearing. But that approach makes little sense from a public policy perspective, as many defendants—particularly those in complex cases, such as homicide cases—are released in a second or subsequent hearing. So that researchers and policymakers can rely on the Bail Reform Study’s information about pretrial “releasees,” the Study should report comprehensive information about all those who were, in fact, released under the new release procedures.¹⁴⁶

4. The Bail Reform Study should provide more detailed information about the specific types of crimes committed by pretrial releasees in both the “before” and “after” periods, particularly the kind of violent crimes and shooting offenses that were committed. Because the Study is vague about the nature of the recidivism of pretrial releasees, it is difficult to engage in detailed cost-benefit analysis about General Order 18.8A. The costs of the General Order are likely to be concentrated in the most violent crimes, particularly homicides and shooting offenses. Detailed information about those crimes is needed.¹⁴⁷

We sent an advance copy of our study to the Office of the Chief Judge requesting comments on these points and, more broadly, on our study, but had not received any response by the time this article was released. We continue to hope that the Office of the Chief Judge will consider the points advanced here and provide detailed answers regarding these important issues.

B. Some Tentative Thoughts on a Complete Cost-Benefit Assessment.

For the reasons just explained, it is impossible at this time to precisely tabulate all of G.O. 18.8A’s costs—i.e., the increase in the number of crimes caused by the new, more generous pretrial release procedures. We hope that it will be possible to have better information soon, which would then be the first step in a more rigorous cost-benefit analysis than that offered by the Bail Reform Study. But, at this preliminary stage, we offer some tentative thoughts on how a complete cost-benefit analysis might ultimately be made as more data becomes available.

1. The Costs of Expanded Pretrial Release.

We turn first to the costs of G.O. 18.8A. In determining how to calculate costs, we are aided by Professor Shima Baradaran Baughman’s pathbreaking recent article,

¹⁴⁶ See *supra* notes 115-18 and accompanying text.

¹⁴⁷ See *supra* notes 119-22 and accompanying text.

“Costs of Pretrial Detention.”¹⁴⁸ There, Professor Baughman sketches out how a comprehensive cost-benefit assessment might be made of a change of pretrial release procedures. In assessing the potential costs of expanded pretrial release, Baughman identifies four kinds of costs: (1) additional prosecuted crimes during the pretrial release period; (2) additional crimes not detected during the pretrial release period; (3) additional failures to appear in court; and (4) additional costs of monitoring released defendants. Focusing on the first two costs,¹⁴⁹ it is important to have some measure of the number of crimes committed by pretrial releasees that are not detected by law enforcement. For example, we have estimated above that an additional 1,212 defendants were charged with new crimes while released, including 70 new violent crime charges as well as a total 280 new charges for crimes against persons.¹⁵⁰ These measures of recidivism rely on police detecting and solving the

¹⁴⁸ Shima Baradaran Baughman, *Costs of Pretrial Detention*, 97 BOST. U.L. REV. 1 (2017).

¹⁴⁹ The other costs are not trivial. For example, Cook County appears to be spending millions of dollars more on probation officers to monitor the increased number of pretrial releasees. See Patrick Smith, *Bail Reform Forces Cook County to Add 70-Plus Probation Officers*, NPR – WBEZ Chicago (Nov. 5, 2019), available at <https://www.npr.org/local/309/2019/11/05/776352061/bail-reform-forces-cook-county-to-add-70-plus-probation-officers>. Of course, the cost of probation officers to monitor releasees is far less than the cost of maintaining those same releasees in jail.

¹⁵⁰ To be clear, the figure of 280 above includes the 70 violent crimes.

This finding of increased crimes by an increased number of releasees is also consistent with another recent study. See Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal Yang, *The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Convictions, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges*, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 226-27 (2018). The Dobbie study concluded that the marginal released defendant was 18.9% more likely to be rearrested for a new crime prior to disposition, *id.* at 226, a finding consistent with our finding that the marginal released defendant under G.O. 18.8A was more prone to committing additional crimes. See *infra* notes 159-71 and accompanying text. But Dobbie’s finding was somewhat offset, from a cost-benefit point of view, by a medium-run criminogenic effect—essentially that exposure to pretrial incarceration leads to more crime in later years after the disposition of the crime for which pretrial detention occurred. *Id.* at 226-27. One difference between the Dobbie study and the Bail Reform Study is that it included misdemeanor defendants. *Id.* at 209-10. A criminogenic effect from pretrial incarceration seems more likely to occur for defendants who might otherwise escape incarceration altogether. *Cf. id.* at 236 (noting that lack of criminal conviction leads to increased employment and decreased likelihood of future criminal activity). In Cook County, the defendants at issue were all felony defendants who would have often been incarcerated at sentencing regardless of pretrial detention decisions. These factors all warrant additional research.

The Dobbie study also contains an on-line appendix reporting the results of a cost-benefit analysis of the results of a marginal release of an individual pretrial. They find a net positive benefit, but it appears that one important part of that calculation is that releasing an individual pretrial would lead to an overall *decreased* risk of murder, thereby saving between \$4 million to \$11 million for each murder prevented. See *id.* (Online App. D). This is a curious result, unexplained in the main paper, that appears to be at odds with the possible

new crime and then prosecutors filing new charges. Of course, not every crime committed by a pretrial releasee is solved by police and then prosecuted by prosecutors. So for an accurate cost-benefit calculation, some substantial adjustment is necessary. Given that police solve or “clear” violent crimes only about 45% of the time and property crimes only about 20% of the time, any cost calculation based on charged crimes will likely require multiplication by 200% or more to reflect the number of crimes released defendants actually committed.¹⁵¹ One of the defects in the Bail Reform Study is that it fails to acknowledge that its data on additional charges filed against pretrial releasees does not capture all of the crimes that those releasees likely committed.¹⁵²

One conservative calculation will illustrate this point. We have previously estimated that the expanded pretrial releases from G.O. 18.8A led to at least 280 additional charged new crimes against persons in the fifteen months after the Order compared to the fifteen months before. Using crime clearance rates to estimate what fraction these charged crimes were compared to the crimes actually committed by the pretrial releasees, we can estimate that G.O. 18.8A led to 930 additional crimes against persons in the “after” period compared to the “before” before.¹⁵³

increase in homicides by pretrial releasees in Cook County. *See supra* notes 110-14 and accompanying text.

¹⁵¹ *See, e.g.*, Cassell & Fowles, *Still Handcuffing the Cops*, *supra* note 13, at 709 (figure 2 – violent crime clearance rates nationally around 45%), 710 (figure 3 – property crime clearance rates nationally around 20%). Clearance rates in Cook County (particularly in Chicago) may be lower than national averages. *See* Jeremy Gorner, *With Its Low Solve Rate for Shootings, Chicago Police to Add 50 Sergeants to Oversee Detectives*, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 2018, available at <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-met-chicago-police-detectives-20181203-story.html>; *but cf.* Frank Main, *Chicago’s Murder-Clearance Rate Rose Sharply in 2019, Police Say*, Chi. Sun-Times, Dec. 31, 2019 (Chicago’s murder clearance rate rose from 29% in 2016 to 53% in 2019), available at <https://chicago.suntimes.com/politics/2019/12/31/21044720/murder-clearance-rate-chicago-police-department>.

¹⁵² *See, e.g.*, BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 6, at 36 (apparently asserting that the study’s data capture all crimes committed by pretrial releasees).

¹⁵³ To derive this number, we first took Chicago’s “violent” crime clearance rate for 2018, which is 30.1%. *See* Chicago Police Dep’t, 2018 Annual Report at 62 (reporting clearance rates for homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery), available at <http://home.chicagopolice.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/2018AnnualReport-05July19.pdf>. We then applied that 30.1% figure to our estimated 280 charged new crimes against persons to produce our estimated actual number of crimes against persons. This is a conservative calculation (i.e., produces a lower figure) because the clearance rate for “violent” crimes is higher than for other crimes, which receive less attention from law enforcement. Here again, we use Chicago figures rather than Cook County figures, because of their ready availability. *See supra* note 92.

Even with some estimate of the actual number of crimes committed by pretrial releasees in hand, the salient issue becomes what cost to assign to each additional crime committed. Other research has explored this subject of the cost of crime.¹⁵⁴ In her article on pretrial detention, Professor Baughman has helpfully collected some of the available information in a table, containing an estimate for the range of the costs for each type of crime that might be avoided through pretrial detention.

The striking conclusion from that table is that any cost-benefit calculation will likely hinge on the number of additional murders produced by increasing pretrial releases, perhaps in combination with a few other very serious crimes (such as rapes and shootings). Professor Baughman reports that, in a cost-benefit calculation regarding pretrial release programs, the benefits of avoiding a murder range (according to previous research) from \$4,602,326 to \$18,780,120 (in 2014 dollars).¹⁵⁵ The high figure includes not only tangible but also intangible costs,¹⁵⁶ an issue that one could debate in deciding how best to conduct a cost-benefit calculation. But for present purposes, it is enough to note that even if G.O. 18.8A produced just a few additional homicides, there would be a serious argument that the costs of the measure were substantial, in the tens of millions of dollars. Of course, given the *Chicago Tribune's* discovery that rather than just three murders being committed by pretrial releasee after the Order a total of 21 were committed,¹⁵⁷ this possibility is no mere speculative possibility.

This issue of additional crimes committed by additional pretrial releasees is critical to any full cost-benefit analysis, as bail reformers have been optimistic that more accurate tools for making pretrial release decisions would allow additional defendants to be released without any increase in crime.¹⁵⁸ But, properly understood, the data from Cook County raises questions about whether this will be possible.

¹⁵⁴ See, e.g., Cassell & Fowles, *supra* note 14, at 1648 (reporting research on the cost of gun crimes).

¹⁵⁵ *Id.* at 11 (citing Matt DeLisi et al., *Murder by Numbers: Monetary Costs Imposed by a Sample of Homicide Offenders*, 21 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 501, 506 tbl.1 (2010); Ted R. Miller, Mark A. Cohen & Brian Wiersema, U.S. Dep't of Justice, NCJ 155282, *Victim Costs and Consequences: A New Look 9-18*VICTIM COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: A NEW LOOK 9 tbl. 2 (1996), <https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/Abstract.aspx?id=155282> [<https://perma.cc/468DHALR>]). One of us (Fowles) has used a different methodology, limited to tangible costs, to produce figures (for Utah) that are lower. See Fowles & Nyström, *supra* note 12, at 6. Exploring differences in these calculations is beyond the scope of this article.

¹⁵⁶ Baughman, *supra* note 148, at 9

¹⁵⁷ See *supra* notes 110-14 and accompanying text.

¹⁵⁸ See, e.g., Arnold Ventures, *2017 Annual Report: Creating a Fairer Pretrial System*, available at <https://www.arnoldventures.org/stories/creating-a-fairer-pretrial-system/> (discussing PSA as “producing better overall outcomes”).

Cook County released pretrial about 4,000 more defendants in the fifteen months after G.O. 18.8A went into effect than in the fifteen months before.¹⁵⁹ Given that more defendants were released in the “after” period, the question naturally arises as to whether the G.O. produced more defendants charged with new crimes because more defendants were being released or because more dangerous defendants were released. The data suggest that the answer is *both*.

As reported by the Bail Reform Study, pretrial releasees in the “after” period went up numerically by about 20%.¹⁶⁰ Accordingly, one might expect the number of crimes to have increased by about 20%. But the total (estimated) crimes committed in the “after” period vs. the “before” period went up by substantially more than 20%—indeed, by roughly 45%.¹⁶¹ So it appears that somewhat more than half of the additional estimated crimes appear have resulted from the release of a more dangerous (i.e., more crime-prone) population of defendants.

Another approach that also suggests this conclusion is that in the fifteen months before G.O.18.8A, 20,435 defendants¹⁶² were released for an average of 243 days.¹⁶³ Multiplying those numbers together produces 4,965,705 days when defendants were released pretrial before the new G.O. During those days that they were released, 3,715 defendants were charged with committing new crimes.¹⁶⁴ This means that during the “before” period, it took 1,337 days of defendants being released for the public to suffer a new charged crime¹⁶⁵ from a pretrial releasee.¹⁶⁶

In the fifteen months after G.O.18.8A, 24,504 defendants¹⁶⁷ were released for an average of 154 days.¹⁶⁸ Multiplying those numbers together produces 3,773,616 days when defendants were released pretrial after the G.O. During those days that

¹⁵⁹ See BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 6, at 31 (table 6A) (20,435 released before, 24,504 released after). As discussed above, these figures apparently include only those defendants released at initial bail hearings. See *supra* notes 115-18 and accompanying text.

¹⁶⁰ $24,504/20,435 = 1.20$.

¹⁶¹ $6,059 \div 3,715 = 1.63$.

¹⁶² $17,431 \text{ males} + 3,004 \text{ females} = 20,435 \text{ total defendants}$.

¹⁶³ BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 2, at 30.

¹⁶⁴ Subtracting total defendants from “crime free” defendants, i.e., $14,146 \text{ crime-free males} + 2,574 \text{ crime-free females} = 16,720 \text{ total crime-free defendants}$, which can be subtracted from 20,435 released defendants to produce the result that 3,715 defendants were not crime free.

¹⁶⁵ For simplicity in calculation, we assume that a defendant who was not “crime-free” committed one crime. It is likely that the pool of such defendants committed, on average, more than one crime.

¹⁶⁶ $4,965,705 \text{ days} \div 3,715 \text{ crimes} = 1,337 \text{ days for each crime}$.

¹⁶⁷ $21,326 \text{ males} + 3,178 \text{ females} = 24,504 \text{ total defendants}$.

¹⁶⁸ BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 2, at 30.

they were released, the 4,164 defendants were charged with committing new crimes.¹⁶⁹ This means during the “after” period, it took 906 days of defendants being released for the public to suffer a new charged crime from a pretrial releasee.¹⁷⁰

In other words, after the reform, it appears that the population of defendants being released committed crimes against the public more rapidly than the population before—committing a new crime (on average) in 906 days rather than the earlier 1,337 days—presumably because more dangerous/crime-prone defendants were being released. This means it can be estimated that releasees after G.O. 18.8A were, roughly speaking (and subject to the caveats above), about 50% more likely to commit crimes on an apples-to-apples (i.e., crimes per day) basis than were releasees before G.O. 18.8A.¹⁷¹ The fact that the additional pretrial releasees appear to have been substantially more likely to commit additional crimes is important because bail reform (like other public policy reforms) presumably reaches a point of diminishing returns.

To be sure, G.O. 18.8A’s defenders could properly point out that our “cost” numbers regarding additional crimes constitute a relatively small percentage of the overall number of crimes in Cook County. We agree that it would be unreasonable to attempt to blame Cook County’s expanded pretrial release measures as somehow singlehandedly explaining Cook County’s overall high crime rates. Many other factors would need to be considered. But our focus in this article is whether expanded pretrial release procedures can pay their way forward under a cost-benefit analysis. In this sense, any costs from expanded pretrial release measures are a self-inflicted wound¹⁷²—costs in additional crimes that policymakers could have simply avoided by never “reforming” release procedures at all.

Defenders of G.O. 18.8A are also likely to argue that, even under a more fulsome cost-benefit analysis of the type we are describing here, the measure could still ultimately prove to be cost-beneficial. These arguments are not without basis, as we discuss in the next section below. But the key point of our article is not that G.O. 18.8A could never be justified as cost-beneficial; rather, our more limited point is that it has yet to be so justified. The Bail Reform Study appears to rest on an

¹⁶⁹ Subtracting total defendants from “crime-free” defendants, i.e., 17,591 crime-free males + 2,749 crime-free females = 20,340 total crime-free defendants, which can be subtracted from 24,504 released defendants to produce the result that 4,164 defendants were not crime-free. Of course, as discussed at length above, this figure likely undercounts the number of defendants in the “after” period who were not crime-free.

¹⁷⁰ 3,773,616 days ÷ 4,164 crimes = 906 days for each crime.

¹⁷¹ 1,337 ÷ 906 = 1.475.

¹⁷² Cf. FRED P. GRAHAM, *THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND* (1970) (discussing unnecessary costs stemming from release of convicted criminals due to *Miranda*’s retroactive application).

illusion that G.O. 18.8A is entirely without costs¹⁷³—i.e., that it did not in any way increase crimes committed against the public. Our conclusion is that the situation is more complicated. In particular, we question the counterintuitive assertion that many more arrested defendants could be released before trial without causing the public to suffer at least some additional crimes. Instead, the analysis here suggests that at least some additional crimes—and, thus, additional costs—have to be tabulated as part of a thorough cost-benefit analysis.

2. The Benefits of Expanded Pretrial Release.

While G.O. 18.8A's costs need to be accurately measured, the Order undeniably provided considerable benefits to the public and to the released defendants that need to be measured as well. Here again, Professor Baughman's article provides a helpful starting point for analysis. As she explained, expanding pretrial release can be expected to produce multiple benefits, including benefits to detainees of avoiding loss of liberty, standing in the community, and disruption to family life and other relationships and of mitigating direct economic costs (lost income and lost job opportunities).¹⁷⁴ Expanded pretrial release can also produce benefits to society, notably reduction in the direct costs associated with incarcerating defendants (i.e., the costs of building and operating jails) and the indirect costs, such as depriving children of the financial and emotional support that their detained parents would otherwise be able to provide as well as difficult-to-quantify costs related to impacts on the presumption of innocence.¹⁷⁵

Estimating the value of such benefits is difficult—but not impossible. Professor Baughman, for example, has made an initial stab at what such figures might look like for national levels of pretrial release decisions.¹⁷⁶ In this article, we are not in a position to calculate the value of all these benefits for the changes implemented in Cook County through G.O. 18.8A. But we tentatively suggest that, using Baughman's approach, it may be the case that G.O. 18.8A is not cost-beneficial.

As noted above,¹⁷⁷ as a jurisdiction increases the number of defendants who are released pretrial, the pool of pretrial releases will often become progressively

¹⁷³ Cf. Paul G. Cassell, *All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda's Defenders*, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 1084 (1996) (arguing that *Miranda* reforms have not been subjected to serious cost-benefit analysis).

¹⁷⁴ See Baughman, *supra* note 148, at 5-6, 16-17.

¹⁷⁵ See *id.* at 6-7, 16-17.

¹⁷⁶ See *id.* at 16-17.

¹⁷⁷ See *supra* note 171 and accompanying text.

more dangerous. Professor Baughman has quantified this important point with her cost-benefit calculations about pretrial release decisions, based on data from multiple jurisdictions across the country. Her data suggest that initially a societal net benefit exists to increasing the percentage of defendants who are released pretrial—but at some point, releasing more defendants becomes too dangerous and further releases are not net beneficial.¹⁷⁸ Using her data, Professor Baughman derives a figure for the optimal level of pretrial releases. She estimates that releasing defendants until the point at which about 31% of all defendants are detained produces a net societal benefit—compared to the 38% rate at which judges around the country currently detain defendants.¹⁷⁹

Professor Baughman’s estimate has important public policy implications for bail reform efforts in this country. If her estimate is correct, pretrial releases could be expanded around the country and produce a net societal benefit in the average jurisdiction. But Baughman’s calculation of an optimal national release rate becomes quite interesting when compared to Cook County’s rate. Before G.O. 18.8A, Cook County detained only 28.4% of felony defendants—already a higher percentage of releases than Baughman estimates would be optimal. And after the new procedures were implemented, Cook County’s detention rate fell even further, to only 19.5%¹⁸⁰—a significantly lower percentage of defendants detained than the percentage that Professor Baughman estimates would be optimal. This suggests that Cook County may have taken its reform measures to such an extreme that, however well-intentioned, they went too far.

In addition, one cautionary note is needed about the kind of cost-benefit calculations that Baughman’s article so nicely summarizes. Baughman’s cost-benefit calculations implicitly equate (for example) a one dollar value of a defendant’s liberty with a one dollar value of the cost of a crime. While from a pure dollars-and-cents point of view, this assumption can be defended, relying on the assumption for public policy purposes creates what economists characterize as “distributional” issues.¹⁸¹ The benefits of expanded pretrial release are most directly conferred, of course, on the defendants who have been arrested. On the other hand, the costs of the crimes those releasees commit fall on victims who, by and large, have done nothing to warrant suffering those crimes committed. Without considering the relative entitlement to benefits of the two groups—presumptive criminals and their victims—it is difficult to argue that a simple cost-benefit analysis accurately captures the relative tradeoffs.

¹⁷⁸ See Baughman, *supra* note 148, at 19-23.

¹⁷⁹ See *id.* at 21-22.

¹⁸⁰ See BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 6, at 24.

¹⁸¹ For an illustration of how distributional issues can affect cost-benefit analysis, see, e.g., Miqdad Asaria et al., *Distributional Cost-Effectiveness Analysis—A Tutorial*, 36 MEDICAL DECISIONMAKING 8 (2016) (explaining how health inequality concerns can affect cost-benefit analysis when implementing medical reforms).

It is possible to illustrate this point with a hypothetical example. Let's assume that new expanded pretrial release procedures could be implemented in our hypothetical jurisdiction—giving defendants greater liberty but at the cost of additional crimes. Let's also assume that the new procedures produce one additional murder, ten additional rapes, one hundred additional assaults, and one hundred additional robberies. The total cost of these new procedures, using (conservative) figures from Professor Baughman's table on the costs of crime, is about \$7.5 million, mostly stemming from the additional murder.¹⁸² On the other hand, let's also assume that the new procedures confer certain benefits on the released defendants, such as greater freedom, greater income, and lower strain on intimate relationships.¹⁸³ Let's further assume that our hypothetical jurisdiction's expanded pretrial release procedures will release 500 defendants for an additional 100 days each. The total benefit conferred on defendants of the new procedures, using Professor Baughman's figures is about \$9,000,000¹⁸⁴—a million dollars more than the cost. And yet we are uncertain whether many policy makers would be convinced to adopt the new measure based on the greater benefits conferred on the pool of defendants. After all, the one thing that we do know for certain about every pretrial detainee is that, even though he is presumed to be innocent, he has done something that led a judge to find probable cause for believing the defendant committed a serious crime justifying detention.¹⁸⁵ Giving equal weight to the benefits the pool of such defendants receive when compared to the costs inflicted on crime victims seems dubious.

To be sure, this hypothetical example would require additional examination before determining whether it was cost-beneficial. Most obviously, the general public also incurs costs if defendants are detained—e.g., the significant costs of jailing detainees. But here again, distributional issues arise. The costs of crime appear to fall most heavily on impoverished communities;¹⁸⁶ benefits of tax savings will, of course, extend disproportionately to upper-income taxpayers who pay the most taxes. In addition, some of the distributional issues will involve other innocent persons. Pretrial detention of parents, for example, imposes costs on children who lose financial and emotional support¹⁸⁷ (not to mention the costs to taxpayers who may have to provide financial assistance to such children). The basic point remains that without some assessment of the relative entitlement of the recipients of the cost and benefits of bail reform, the cost-benefit analysis is incomplete.

¹⁸² See *id.* at 11 (table 2) (providing “low” estimate of the cost of murder at \$4,602,326; of rape at \$136,191; of assault at \$14,715; and of robbery at \$12,523).

¹⁸³ See Baughman, *supra* note 148, at 16-17.

¹⁸⁴ 500 defendants released x 100 days per defendant x \$180 benefit from release = \$9 million.

¹⁸⁵ See *Gerstein v. Pugh*, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (requiring judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to any prolonged period of detention).

¹⁸⁶ See Cassell & Fowles, *supra* note 14, at 1587-89.

¹⁸⁷ See Baughman, *supra* note 148, at 7.

Other distributional issues also exist with the benefits of bail reform. As the Bail Reform Study repeatedly noted, the additional persons who received release under G.O. 18.8A were disproportionately members of racial minority groups (particularly African-Americans and Hispanics).¹⁸⁸ But as corollary to this point, it is virtually certain that the costs of the additional crimes committed as the result of the changes are not distributed evenly throughout Cook County, but rather are heavily concentrated among minority crime victims. The victims of crime in Cook County (and particularly violent crimes) do not mirror Cook County's population. On the contrary, the vast majority of the victims were racial minorities.¹⁸⁹ For example, of the 2018 Chicago homicide victims, 79.9% were African-American, 13.7% were Hispanic, and 5.7% were white.¹⁹⁰ Additionally, of the 2018 Chicago aggravated assault and battery victims, at least¹⁹¹ 69.1% were African-American, 19.6% were Hispanic, and 8.9% were white.¹⁹²

A related point can be made about another commonly cited benefit of bail reform. Proponents of expanded pretrial release have often noted that defendants who are held pretrial are more likely to be convicted. From 1990 to 2004, 78 percent of pretrial detainees were eventually convicted, but only 60 percent of alleged criminals released were convicted of a crime.¹⁹³ A conventional narrative offered to explain these differences is that defendants who are detained are less able to assist with their defense.¹⁹⁴ This may, of course, explain part of the difference; but other explanations seem important, particularly in Cook County. As suggested by the increased “drop” rate in domestic violence cases after G.O. 18.8A, some released defendants take advantage of their liberty to intimidate their victims into dropping charges. For these defendants, the lower conviction rate should not be regarded as a social benefit but a social cost. And these costs are not distributed equally. Instead,

¹⁸⁸ See BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 6, at 2, 12.

¹⁸⁹ See Dahleen Glanton, *With 500 Homicides in Chicago, Time for African-Americans to Get Tough on Crime*, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 7, 2016, <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/columnists/ct-violence-african-americans-glanton-20160907-column.html> (discussing disproportionate number of African-American victims, as well as perpetrators, in Chicago in 2016).

¹⁹⁰ CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 52 (2019).

¹⁹¹ Of the reported cases of aggravated assault and battery, 6.3% had an unknown or undisclosed victim race/ethnicity, thereby creating the possibility that the minority victimization rates for this offense are higher than indicated.

¹⁹² CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 53 (2019).

¹⁹³¹⁹³ See THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN REAVES, PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS, STATE COURT PROCESSING STATISTICS 1990-2004 (2007), available at <https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf>, *cited in* Baughman, *supra* note 1, at 83.

¹⁹⁴ See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, *Designing Plea Bargaining from the Ground Up: Accuracy and Fairness Without Trials as Backstops*, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1071 (2016).

the costs are concentrated among women, particularly among lower-income minority women.¹⁹⁵

Another point that appears to have often been overlooked in discussions about bail reform is that a defendant who is released pretrial will often be convicted and then sentenced to a term of incarceration. If that defendant had been detained pretrial, he would receive credit for time served as part of his sentence. Unless bail reform is coupled with lower terms of imprisonment (a separate issue) the mere fact of pretrial release does not necessarily equate with cost savings from shorter terms of imprisonment.

For example, if one defendant is charged with armed robbery and obtains pretrial release for six months while his case adjudicated, he might upon conviction be sentenced to two years in prison. A defendant facing an identical charge who does not obtain pretrial release might also ultimately be sentenced to two years in prison, but receive credit for the six months of pretrial detention. From a cost-of-incarceration perspective, the costs of the two cases are roughly the same¹⁹⁶—both defendants are incarcerated for two years. But a simplistic bail reform calculation might calculate the cost of incarceration to be six months shorter for the second defendant, ignoring the issue of credit for time served.

Transferring this point to the Bail Reform Study, distributional issues may arise. If the first defendant faces two years in prison, it may be the case that the taxpayers of Illinois pay for his incarceration in state prison. For the second defendant, it may be the case that taxpayers in Cook County pay for his six months of detention in jail while Illinois taxpayers pay for his eighteen months in prison.¹⁹⁷ Thus, from a societal point of view, while there is no difference between the costs of the two cases, County County will claim a cost “saving” that is really merely a cost transfer—a transfer of the cost to another set of taxpayers.

To be clear, we are fully prepared to consider arguments that shorter terms of incarceration are cost-beneficial. Indeed, one of us (Cassell) has very publicly criticized certain lengthy mandatory minimum sentences.¹⁹⁸ But the point here is that if total terms of incarceration remain equal both before and after a bail reform, it is not accurate to attribute cost saving to a mere transfer of expense.

¹⁹⁵ See CHI. TRIB. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INVESTIGATION, *supra* note 123.

¹⁹⁶ We assume that jail costs and prison costs are equal, although there may be some marginal differences between the two.

¹⁹⁷ We are not familiar with the details of how Illinois finances incarceration, but the point made in text would be the case in our home state of Utah and, we believe, many other states.

¹⁹⁸ See, e.g., Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, *Mandatory Minimalism*, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2010).

As a final point, some readers may wonder whether all of this discussion of costs and benefits is academic, because of the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees. After all, if a defendant has a constitutional right to pretrial release, then any debate about whether their detention is cost-beneficial is beside the point. This brief article is not the place for an extended discussion of the constitutionality of pretrial detention.¹⁹⁹ It is enough to note that many other researchers in this area have assumed the pretrial detention can be implemented constitutionally.²⁰⁰ And the Chief Judge who promulgated G.O. 18.8A does not believe that, as currently drafted, his Order is constitutionally required. Instead, as disclosed in the end of the Bail Reform Study, the Chief Judge is considering modifications that might “strengthen public safety” in connection with (for example) firearms offenses.²⁰¹ We simply follow in that vein to consider whether other alterations of the G.O. might also be appropriate.

Again, we emphasize we are not arguing that bail reform measures such as G.O. 18.8A will ultimately fail a rigorous cost-benefit assessment. Instead, we offer these points as cautionary counterweights to be considered before one accepts the Bail Reform Study’s optimistic conclusions that the 2017 changes were, indeed, cost-beneficial. More careful analysis considering the points raised here is necessary before any definitive conclusions can be reached.

VI. CONCLUSION

This article examines the conclusions of the Cook County Bail Reform Study, which offered data suggesting that Cook County’s recent bail reform efforts expanded pretrial release without any increase in crime. The Study’s presentation of empirical evidence on this crucial issue regarding bail reform is commendable.²⁰² But a concern about bias always lurks when an entity implementing a reform later studies whether that reform was successful. In this case, it appears that many dangers stemming from the Cook County court’s expansion of pretrial release were not carefully assessed by the court’s own subsequent study.

A more careful analysis of the Study’s underlying data challenges the Study’s upbeat conclusions. Contrary to the Study’s assertion that bail reform did not increase crimes by pretrial releasees, its data suggest that quantifiable and significant increases in crimes occurred. Based on reanalysis of the data, after the Cook County courts implemented more expansive pretrial release procedures, the number of released defendants who were charged with committing new crimes increased by

¹⁹⁹ *Cf. U.S. v Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding federal pretrial detention practices).

²⁰⁰ *See, e.g.,* Baughman, *supra* note 148.

²⁰¹ BAIL REFORM STUDY, *supra* note 6, at 37.

²⁰² *See generally* Megan Stevenson, *Assessing Risk Assessment in Action*, 103 MINN. L. REV. 303, 312-14 (2018) (describing benefits of evidence-based criminal justice policymaking).

about 45%. And, more concerning, the number of pretrial releasees who were charged with committing new violent crimes increased by about 33%. Recent investigations by the *Chicago Tribune* also raise concern about whether, after the procedural changes, pretrial releasees committed more homicides and intimidated more victims of aggravated domestic violence into dropping charges. We also conservatively estimate that at least 930 additional crimes against persons were committed by pretrial releasees in the fifteen months after the changes than in the fifteen months before. These public safety harms call into question whether Cook County's bail "reform" measures were truly cost-beneficial.

These conclusions about the Cook County reform measures have broader implications. Cook County appears to have used state-of-the-art risk assessment. Cook County's Public Safety Assessment tool was implemented with the assistance of the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, which has been actively involved in bail reform efforts across the country. The Foundation's risk assessment instrument has been used, in some form or another, in over 29 jurisdictions, including three state-wide programs.²⁰³ Cook County is one of the nation's largest jurisdictions, which appears to have diligently attempted to follow the Foundation's recommendations. If Cook County's bail reforms have produced additional crimes, then many other jurisdictions may have suffered similar harmful consequences.

We again underscore that this article does not reach definitive conclusions about the balance of costs and benefits in Cook County. Instead, this article makes a more limited but important point. As Cook County's experience demonstrates, bail reform measures are not always cost-free. Additional crimes committed against the public are costs of such changes that policymakers must carefully consider in reaching an ultimate cost-benefit conclusion. To be sure, such pretrial release reforms can have significant benefits. But only if both benefits and costs are accurately measured can a sound decision be made about which way the scales tip and whether the "reform" was truly an improvement.

²⁰³ BAUGHMAN, *supra* note 1, at 66.